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Abstract
by
Chao Luo
The objective of this dissertation is to study the interplay between large-scale
electric vehicle (EV) charging and the power system. In particular, we address three
important issues pertaining to EV charging and integration into the power system: (1)
charging station placement, (2) pricing policy and energy management strategy, and
(3) electricity trading market and distribution network design to facilitate integrating
EV and renewable energy source (RES) into the power system.
Regarding the charging station placement problem, we propose a multi-stage con-
sumer behavior based placement strategy with incremental EV penetration rates and
model the EV charging industry as an oligopoly where the entire market is dominated
by a few charging service providers (oligopolists). A nested logit model is employed to
characterize the charging preference of the EV owners. The optimal placement policy
for each service provider is obtained by solving a Bayesian game. We also developed
a simulation toolkit called “The EV Virtual City” based on Repast. We observe that
service providers prefer clustering instead of separation in the EV charging market.
As for the problem of pricing and energy management of EV charging stations,
we provide guidelines for charging service providers to determine charging price and
manage electricity reserve to balance the competing objectives of improving prof-
Chao Luo
itability, enhancing customer satisfaction, and reducing impact on the power system.
In the presence of renewable energy integration and energy storage system, EV charg-
ing service providers must deal with a number of uncertainties, e.g., charging demand
volatility, inherent intermittency of renewable energy generation, and wholesale elec-
tricity price fluctuation. We propose a new metric to assess the impact on power
system without needing to solve complete power flow equations. Two algorithms —
stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) algorithm and greedy algorithm (benchmark
algorithm) — are applied to derive the pricing and electricity procurement strategy.
We find that the charging service provider is able to reshape spatial-temporal charg-
ing demands to reduce the impact on power grid via pricing signals.
The last technical contribution of this dissertation is on the design of a novel elec-
tricity trading market and distribution network, which provides a platform to support
seamless RES integration, grid to vehicle (G2V), vehicle to grid (V2G), vehicle to
vehicle (V2V), and distributed generation (DG) and storage. We apply a sharing
economy model to the electricity sector to stimulate different entities to exchange
and monetize their underutilized electricity. We propose an online advertisement-
based peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity trading mechanism. A fitness-score (FS)-based
supply-demand matching algorithm is developed by considering consumer surplus,
electricity network congestion, and economic dispatch. We compare the FS matching
algorithm with the first-come-first-serve (FCFS) algorithm. The simulation results
show that the FS matching algorithm outperforms the FCFS algorithm in terms of
network congestion management, electricity delivery delay probability, energy effi-
ciency, and consumer surplus.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the EV ecosystem, which includes
EV and EV charging infrastructure, EV market and manufacturers, the relationship
between EV charging and power systems, as well as challenges that the EV industry
may face.
1.2 EV Ecosystem
A complete EV ecosystem is illustrated in Fig. 1.1. Main entities like power
plants, independent system operator (ISO) or regional transmission organization
(RTO), EV charging infrastructure are included in this figure. The energy flow (blue
line) and the cash flow (green line) show the interaction among different entities.
1.2.1 Power Plant
A power plant generates electricity by burning fossil fuels like coal or natural gas,
or by using clean and renewable sources like nuclear energy, solar, or wind. A power
plant can either sell the electricity to specific consumers through bilateral contracts
(or futures), or sell the electricity in a wholesale market through auctions.
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Figure 1.1. Energy Flow and Cash Flow in EV Ecosystem
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1.2.2 ISO/RTO
In the United States, ISO/RTO is an organization that coordinates, controls, and
monitors the power grid. For instance, California ISO (CAISO), Southwest Power
Pool (SPP), Midcontinent ISO (MISO) and PJM Interconnection are ISO/RTOs.
ISO/RTO determines the day-ahead clearing price and the ancillary service price
through an auction between power plants and buyers. ISO/RTO also operates the
electricity real-time market, where the electricity price is cleared in real-time and the
power plants must deliver the committed electricity immediately.
1.2.3 Reseller
The resellers are buyers in the auction in the wholesale market. The load serving
entity (LSE) and electricity marketers are typical resellers in the market.
1.2.4 EV Charging Infrastructure
EV owners can either install an EV charging station at home or go to a public
charging station. So, EV charging infrastructure can be done at either private or
public infrastructures.
1.2.5 Electricity Transmission Network
Electricity transmission is the long distance delivery of bulk electricity from power
plants to substations, in which electricity is transferred using the transmission lines
with high-voltage (i.e. 69 kV, 115 kV and 138 kV). The transmission lines are inter-
connected to form the transmission network.
1.2.6 Electricity Distribution Network
The electricity distribution network delivers electricity from the local substations
to end users using a relatively low voltage (i.e. 120/240 V in North America, and
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220, 230, or 240 V in Europe).
1.3 Emerging EV Market
As consumers are becoming more aware of the environmental impact of the green-
house gas emissions as well as promotions and incentives from local governments, the
demand for EVs has been growing over the past several years. From 2008 to June
2015, about 345,000 highway plug-in electric vehicles were sold in the United States,
making it the largest plug-in EV market in the world [1, 2]. The market share of
plug-in EV of new registered cars in the US increased from 0.14% to 0.37% in 2012
and 0.62% in 2013 and 0.72% in 2014 [3]. According to Navigant Research [4], the
global light duty EV market is expected to grow from 2.7 million vehicle sales in 2014
to 6.4 million in 2023.
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In general, EVs can be classified into three main categories: Hybrid Electric
Vehicle (HEV), Plug-in Electric Hybrid Vehicle (PHEV), and Battery Electric Vehicle
(BEV) or All-Electric Vehicle (AEV).
1.3.1 Hybrid Electric Vehicle (HEV)
HEVs are primarily powered by the internal combustion engine (ICE) which uses
gasoline. Each HEV also has an electric motor that uses the electricity stored in the
battery. The battery gets recharged from the regenerative braking and the internal
combustion engine. However, the battery cannot be plugged into the power system
to get recharged. The electric powertrain helps HEVs achieve better fuel economy
and lower emission than the conventional ICE vehicles. Many automakers have re-
leased their HEV-version cars like Honda Civic Hybrid, Ford Fusion Hybrid, BMW
ActiveHybrid 3, etc.
1.3.2 Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV)
PHEVs are powered by both the internal combustion engine (ICE) and the electric
motor. The ICE eliminates the “range anxiety” since PHEVs can switch to the ICE
when the battery is depleted. The battery can be plugged into the power grid to
get recharged. Usually, PHEVs have a larger battery pack than the HEVs, which
increases the “all-electric range”. Some representatives of PHEVs include Ford Fusion
Energi, Chevrolet Volt, Cadillac ELR, etc.
1.3.3 Battery Electric Vehicle/All Electric Vehicle (BEV/AEV)
BEVs or AEVs are solely powered by an electric motor which uses the electricity
from a battery. The battery gets recharged by plugging the vehicle into the power
grid. BEVs do not rely on fossil fuels and they generate zero emissions. The repre-
sentatives of BEVs are Fiat 500e, Nissan Leaf, Tesla Model S, etc.
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Fig. 1.2 shows the trend of EV market share based on the EV sales data from
Electric Drive Transportation Association (EDTA). Note that the plug-in EVs (in-
cluding PHEV and BEV) has a steady increase in market share from 2011 to 2014.
In this dissertation, we focus our attention on BEVs since there are more chal-
lenges and problems associated with this type of EV, as compared to the hybrids. In
the subsequent discussions, we use EVs to refer BEVs.
94%
3%4%
2009 EV Market Share
89%
8%3%
2012 EV Market Share
 
 
84%
8%
8%
2013 EV Market Share
79%
10%
11%
2014 EV Market Share
HEV
BEV
PHEV
Figure 1.3. EV Market Share
6
1.4 Benefits of EVs
In this section, we highlight some of the most prominent benefits of EV.
1.4.1 Economic Growth
Both individual EV owners and automobile manufacturers will benefit from a
vibrant EV industry and the resulting growth in the entire supply chain. Many
studies have shown that electricity is a cheaper fuel than gasoline to propel the
vehicles [5–10]. In particular, [11] showed that the equivalent cost of electricity as a
gallon of gasoline is less than one dollar. In addition, Navigant Research predicted
that the global demand for lithium ion batteries for the light duty fleet will increase
from $3.2 billion in 2013 to $24.1 billion in 2023. The global revenue from the electric
vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) is estimated to reach $5.8 billion in annual revenue
by 2022.
1.4.2 Environmental Sustainability
Massive adoption of EVs offers an opportunity to improve the air quality through
increasing fuel efficiency, reducing or terminating greenhouse gas emissions [5, 12–
16]. Fig. 1.4 illustrates that driving on electricity offers a huge environmental benefit
[17]. The electricity in the US is generated from a diverse portfolio of energy sources
from natural gas to nuclear power, from hydroelectric to coal, from biomass to wind
and solar. More importantly, the portion of renewable energy generation (e.g. wind,
solar, and hydrodic) has increased over these years, which is a more desirable source to
recharge EVs. A lot of efforts have been made to enhance the efficiency of electricity
generation and distribution using smart grid technologies to make EV charging even
more convenient.
7
Figure 1.4. Comparison EV with ICE in Global Warming Emission
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1.4.3 Energy Security
Relying on a single globally traded fuel, i.e. petroleum, is a potential threat to
energy security. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA),
soaring oil price has a negative impact on the US macroeconomic variables. The
growing gasoline cost and the painful spikes in prices often have adverse impacts on
family budget. EVs provide a viable solution to propel our transportation sector
and alleviate dependence on oil. The diverse sources for electricity generation make
electricity price remain relatively stable, which offers some protection for the EV
owners against the volatile gasoline price.
1.5 State of the Art of EV Technology
The continuing evolution of EV technologies empowers EVs to compete with the
ICE vehicles in the competitive automobile market. In particular, recent advances in
powertrain, battery, propulsion motor, power converter, charging, and hybrid control
technology make EVs a viable substitute for the conventional ICE vehicles. In this
section, a brief summary to the state-of-the-art EV technologies will be given.
1.5.1 Powertrain
Generally, the EVs can be classified into three categories: HEV, PHEV, and
BEV (all-electric vehicle). Both PHEVs and BEVs can be recharged by connect-
ing the battery to the power system, so they are also called plug-in electric vehicles
(PEVs). HEVs and PHEVs can be further divided into series HEVs and PHEVs,
parallel HEVs and PHEVs, and series-parallel HEVs and PHEVs according to dif-
ferent configurations of the ICE and the electric motor (EM) [18–20]. Since a BEV
does not have ICE so the EM provides the entire power for the vehicle.
Series HEV and PHEV: In series HEV and PHEV, the ICE mechanical output
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is first converted to electricity through a generator. After a power convertor, the
generated electricity can be utilized to recharge the battery or to power the EM to
propel the wheels. Another function of EM is to harvest the regenerative energy
during braking. The decoupling between the engine and the driving wheel offers the
advantage for HEV and PHEV design to place the generator set. However, series HEV
and PHEV powertrain need three propulsion components: the ICE, the generator,
and the EM, resulting in a lower energy efficiency.
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Figure 1.5. Powertrain: Series HEV and PHEV
Parallel HEV and PHEV: In contrast to series HEV and PHEV, parallel HEV
and PHEV allow both ICE and EM to propel wheels in parallel. The ICE and EM
are both coupled to the drive shaft of the wheels via two clutches. Similar to the
series type, the EM can be used to harvest electricity during braking to recharge
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the battery or absorb the extra power produced by ICE. Compared with the series
hybrid, the parallel HEV and PHEV need only two propulsion components—ICE and
EM. Since ICE and EM can propel the wheel simultaneously, the parallel type can
have a smaller ICE and EM than the series type to achieve the same performance.
(a) Parallel HEV 
(b) Parallel PHEV 
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Figure 1.6. Powertrain: Parallel HEV and PHEV
Series-Parallel HEV and PHEV: Series-parallel HEV and PHEV combine the ad-
vantages of both series hybrid type and parallel hybrid type. However, the series-
parallel type is more complicated and expensive than either the series type or the
parallel type. As the control and manufacturing technologies mature, many automo-
bile manufacturers prefer to adopt this type of design.
BEV: The BEVs do not have the ICE and battery is the sole energy source to
propel the vehicle. The propulsion system is relatively simple compared to HEV and
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Figure 1.7. Powertrain: Series-Parallel HEV and PHEV
PHEV because there is no coupling between the ICE and EM. However, BEVs have
the “range anxiety” problem, since they are without the ICE as the backup energy
source.
1.5.2 Battery
Battery is the only energy source for BEVs and one of two major energy sources for
HEV and PHEV. It is always a challenging task for designers to find an appropriate
battery for EVs with the desirable characteristics, such as high capacity, low cost,
light weight, fast charging, safe operation, durability, long lifetime, and resistance to
severe weather conditions. The limited battery capacity is one of the major concerns
for potential EV consumers. The long charging time is another hinderance that
discourages consumers to purchase EVs. Furthermore, the high cost of battery makes
EVs more expensive than the ICE vehicles, which again places EVs in an unfavorable
situation in the automobile market.
However, the EV battery research has made remarkable progresses in the past
12
Power 
convertor 
Electric 
motor 
Battery 
T
ra
n
s
m
is
s
io
n
 
Figure 1.8. Powertrain: BEV
decades [19, 21, 22]. Currently, various novel technologies are employed to refine the
battery manufacturing process and many superior battery prototypes are under de-
velopment in the labs [23]. In this subsection, we will briefly discuss the development
of EV batteries and present several battery types that were used in the past or are
used currently.
Lead-Acid Battery: The first battery used in transportation is the lead-acid bat-
tery. The lead-acid battery technology is mature and inexpensive but it has many
disadvantages, such as low capacity, heavy, and environmental pollution.
Nickel-Based Battery: The lead-acid battery was soon replaced by the nickel-
based battery, i.e., nickel-cadmium (NiCd) and nickel-metal-hydride (NiMH). The
nickel-based battery has several advantages over the lead-acid battery, such as high
cycle count, good load performance, simple storage and transportation, and good
low-temperature performance. However, the nickel-based battery has some serious
disadvantages like relatively low energy density, memory effect, toxic metal, and high
self-discharge rate.
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ZEBRA Battery: ZEBRA battery utilizes the molten sodium aluminumchloride
(NaAlCl4 ) as the electrolyte. The negative electrode is the molten sodium and
the positive electrode is the nickel in the discharged state and nickel chloride in the
charged state. The operation temperature for ZEBRA battery is 245 C◦ (473 F◦).
ZEBRA battery has the advantages of high energy density (5 times higher than lead
acid battery), large cell, long life cycle, and low material cost. However, this battery
type suffers from high internal resistance and high operating temperature, which
requires delicate internal thermal management.
Lithium-Based Battery: The advent of lithium-based battery gives new life to the
EV industry. There are several battery types belonging to the lithium-based battery
family—lithium-ion (Li-ion), lithium-ion polymer (LiPo), and lithium-iron phosphate
(LiFePO4). The lithium-based battery has the advantages of high energy density, low
self-discharge rate, low maintenance, light, cheap, environmentally friendly, and fast
charging. The limitations of this battery is that the internal resistance is relatively
high. Thus high thermal runaway may lead to fire. It also requires sophisticated
battery management circuit. The current EVs that are equipped with lithium-based
battery include Nissan Leaf, Mitsubishi i-MiEV, Tesla Model S and Chevrolet Volt.
Emerging Battery Technologies: Many other battery technologies are still in the
experimental stage, e.g., metal phase, which gives superior performance. Those bat-
teries are lithium-sulfur (Li-S), zinc-air (Zn-air) and lithium-air (Li-air). Those bat-
teries offer excellent performance and will extend the all electric range and reduce
the manufacturing cost of EVs.
1.6 Challenges of Large-Scale EV Integration
EVs exhibit many advantages over ICE vehicles, like higher fuel efficiency, lower
operating cost, and zero greenhouse gas emissions. Nevertheless, many challenges
remain as major obstacles for EV proliferation. In this section, we briefly discuss
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some of those challenges.
1.6.1 Large-Scale EV Charging Scheduling
Uncontrolled large-scale EV charging will undoubtedly place a heavy burden on
the existing power system legacy. Researchers have done much to investigate the
problem of optimal scheduling of EV charging by using historical data [8, 24], static
time of usage based costs [25–27], power load prediction [28], particle swarm opti-
mization [29], and non-cooperative games [30].
1.6.2 Limited Battery Capacity and Long Charging Time
The onboard battery capacity is the bottleneck to increase the range for all-electric
EVs. For instance, Nissan LEAF has a 24 kWh battery, which only provides a driving
range of 84 miles. Chevrolet Spark EV has a 19 kWh battery with a driving range of
82 miles. Tesla Model S has a larger battery pack with a capacity of 70kWh, offering
a 230 miles range. Moreover, it often takes up to several hours to fully charge the
battery. Obviously, the long charging time is a severe drawback for EV compared to
the ICE vehicles, which can be fully refuelled in only a few minutes.
1.6.3 Insufficient EV Public Charging Infrastructure
The scarcity of public charging stations is another major concern to potential EV
consumers. Currently, most EV charging is done at the residence. The EV owners
find it inconvenient to go to the commercial charging stations either because there are
not enough charging stations available or those charging stations are not deployed
in locations that can be accessed easily. In this dissertation, we propose an EV
charging station placement strategy, which provides guidelines on determining how
many charging stations we need and when and where to deploy them.
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1.6.4 Charging Station Operation and Management
The effective management of EV charging infrastructure is crucial to EV ecosys-
tem. Currently, there is no proper model available for charging station operation in
terms of charging price setting, and energy management strategy. A proper model
should take into account the profitability of charging stations, consumer satisfaction,
and power system stability.
1.6.5 Liberal Electricity Trading Market and Distribution Network
The current wholesale electricity market is not conductive for the interplay be-
tween EVs and RESs. In addition, the current electricity distribution network cannot
naturally support intermittent renewable energy generation. We need to redesign the
electricity trading market and distribution network to facilitate large-scale EV and
RES integration.
In essence, this dissertation addresses some of those challenges that include public
charging infrastructure, charging station operation and management, and electricity
trading market and distribution network.
1.7 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the interaction be-
tween EV charging and the power system. An optimal EV charging station placement
strategy is studied in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, a dynamic pricing and electricity
management model is proposed for EV charging service providers. In Chapter 5, we
present the design of a novel electricity trading market and distribution network for
EVs and RESs. Conclusion and future work are presented in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
INTERPLAY BETWEEN EV CHARGING AND THE POWER SYSTEM
2.1 Overview
This chapter presents an overview on the EV charging system including existing
charging standards, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), and onboard charger.
In addition, the mutual interaction between EV charging and the power system will
be discussed and some relevant technologies like vehicle to grid (V2G) and grid-to-
vehicle (G2V) will also be considered.
2.2 EV Charging System
An EV charging system includes a suite of software and hardware. Many countries
have released their own EV charging standards. Accordingly, EV charging equipment
manufacturers produce different charging connectors.
2.2.1 EV Charging Standard
Currently, there are several popular standards for EV charging. In North America,
the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) has released the standard of electrical
connectors for electric vehicles — SAE J1772, with a formal title of “SAE Surface
Vehicle Recommended Practice J1772 (SAE J1772), SAE Electric Vehicle Conductive
Charge Coupler”. In Japan, CHAdeMO Association, formed by the Tokyo Electric
Power Company, Nissan, Mitsubishi, Fuji Heavy Industries, and Toyota, has released
the CHAdeMO standards for DC fast charging [31]. In Europe, German Association
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of the Automotive Industry (VDA) has released the standard of VDE-AR-E 2623-2-2
[32].
SAE J1772 Standard: SAE J1772 [33] specifies three charging levels with different
voltages and currents.
TABLE 2.1
CHARGE METHOD ELECTRICAL RATINGS (NORTH AMERICA)
Level Voltage(V) Current (A) Charging Time (hour)
Level 1 120 12 16-18
Level 2 208 to 240 32 3-8
Level 3 600 max 400 max <0.5
Level 1 Charging: Level 1 Charging is operated at 120 volts with single phase
alternating current (AC). It may take 16-18 hours to charge an EV. Level 1 Charging
usually takes place at home and all EVs come with the Level 1 Charging cord.
Level 2 Charging: Level 2 Charging is operated at the voltage ranging from 208
volts to 240 volts with single phase AC. It may take 3-8 hours to fully charge the
battery pack. Level 2 Charging is apt for overnight or long-length charging and is the
preferred charging method for both public and private facilities. They are typically
found in shopping malls, parking lots, and commercial buildings. They can also be
charged at residential homes.
Level 3 Charging : Level 3 Charging uses direct current (DC) with a maximum
voltage of 600 volts. It takes less than 30 minutes to charge most of battery packs to
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80% full. The time to full charge is not too much more than what it takes to fill the
gas tank at a gas station. However, the equipment can be quite expensive.
CHAdeMO Standard: To regulate the DC fast charging, CHAdeMO Association
introduced the CHAdeMO standard. According to CHAdeMO standard, DC fast
charging should recharge the battery pack to at least 80% in half an hour using the
optimal DC charger of 50 kW. DC fast charging is performed through an external
dedicated EV charging equipment, usually located in public areas (like parking lot,
shopping mall, etc.) CHAdeMO standard has been the Japanese national standard
since 2012.
VDE-AR-E 2623-2-2 Standard: Originally proposed by Mennekes Elektrotechnik
GmbH & Co. KG in 2009 and later standardized by VDA in 2011, the VDE-AR-E
2623-2-2 EV charging connector has been widely used in Europe. VDA recommends
that accessories and interfaces between the power supply and the EVs that permit
‘fuelling’ at 20, 32, 63 amps (single and three-phase current) and at 70 amps (single-
phase current only) with a maximum operating voltage of 500 volts at 50-60 Hz. This
range will cover the entire range of power supply range worldwide.
Tesla Charging Standard: Tesla mobile charging unit comes with adapters allow-
ing for every type of power outlets, from ordinary 120 volt 12 amp (NEMA 5-20) and
240 volt 50 amp (NEMA 14-50) to SAE J1772 connectors and CHAdeMO connec-
tors. In addition, Tesla Motors is building up its own Supercharger network which
provides DC fast charging service for Tesla vehicles.
2.2.2 Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment
The electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) is a charging meter which draws
electricity from the power system and feeds it to the onboard battery pack through
a charging coupler. An EVSE can be installed either at home or in public. A public
charging station typically has multiple EVSEs. Currently, there are several EVSE
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manufacturers, like ChargePoint, Blink, AeroVironment, etc.
2.2.3 EV Charging Coupler and Plug Receptacle
An EV charging coupler is like a gas pump nozzle which connects the EVSE and
the EV plug receptacle. In the U.S., most EVSEs and EVs are equipped with a
standard charging coupler and receptacle based on the SAE J1772 standard. Any
vehicle with a standard plug receptacle is able to use any J1772-compliant AC Level
1 or AC Level 2 EVSE.
As for DC fast Charging, CHAdeMO [31] is a widely used standard among EVs
manufactured by Japanese automakers, such as Nissan Leaf and Mitsubishi vehicles.
The Chevy Spark and the BMW i3 come with the SAE J1772 combined charging
system (CCS), which uses a single receptacle for AC Level 1, AC Level 2, and DC
Level 3. Additionally, Tesla Motor operates its own supercharger network, which is
based on their own connector and currently only charges Tesla vehicles.
2.3 EV Charging, Power System, and Electricity Market
This subsection discusses the interplay among EV charging, the power system,
and the electricity market.
2.3.1 Power System and Control
Although power system varies in size and structural components, they all share
the following basic characteristics:
• Consist of three phase AC system operating at a constant voltage. Generation
and transmission facilities use three phase equipments. Industrial loads are usu-
ally three phase; single phase residential and commercial loads are distributed
evenly across the phase to effectively balance the three phases.
• The power generators are synchronized to produce electricity using various
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kinds of energy sources, such as fossil fuels, solar, wind, nuclear, etc.
• Transfer electricity to consumers across a wide area. This requires a complex
transmission and distribution system comprising of many subsystems operating
at different voltages.
Fig. 2.1 shows the basic elements of a power system [34]. Electricity is generated
by the generation station (GS) and delivered to the end users through a complicated
network of individual components, transmission lines, substations, feeders, etc.
In general, the electricity transmission network consists of three subsystems:
transmission system, subtransmission system, and distribution system.
Transmission System: It interconnects all major power plants and main load cen-
ters. It forms the backbone of the entire power system. It operates at the highest
voltage levels (typically, above 230 kV). The voltage generated by the generators is
usually in the range of 11 to 35 kV, which needs to be raised up to the transmission
level voltage, say, 230 kV. When the electricity is delivered to the transmission sub-
stations, the voltage is stepped down to match the subtransmission levels (typically,
69 to 138 kV).
Subtransmission System: It delivers the electricity in smaller quantities from
transmission substations to distribution substations. Large industrial customers are
typically supplied directly by the subtransmisison system. In modern electric power
system, there is not a clear delimitation between a transmission system and a sub-
transmission system.
Distribution System: It is responsible for delivering electricity to the end cus-
tomers. Distribution voltages are typically in the rage of 4 to 34.5 kV. Small industrial
customers are supplied by the primary feeders at this voltage level. The secondary
distribution feeders supply residential or commercial customers at 120/240 V voltage
level.
21
Figure 2.1. Basic Elements of a Power System
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The most important task of an electric power system is to deliver electricity from
the power generators to the end customers in a reliable and efficient manner. Power
quality is one of the major issues which must be concerned with. Power quality can
be described by a set of parameters, such as continuity of service, voltage variation,
transient voltage or current, and harmonics. The power system has different levels
of controllers that are intended for frequency control, voltage control, and reliability
control. Basically, there are three groups of controllers in a power system: generating
unit control, system generation control, and transmission control.
Generating Unit Control: It mainly controls the input and output of a generator,
which consists of the prime mover controller and the excitation controller. The prime
mover controller is concerned with the speed regulation and control of energy supply
system variables such as boiler pressure, temperature, and flow. The function of the
excitation controller is to regulate the output voltage and reactive power.
System Generation Control: It is responsible for coordinating the system genera-
tion and the system load and losses so that the desired frequency and power exchange
with adjacent systems are maintained.
Transmission Control: It has a myriad of power and voltage control devices, like
static var compensators, synchronous condensers, capacitors and reactors, transform-
ers, and HVDC transmission controls.
2.3.2 ISO/RTO and Electricity Market
In a deregulated electricity market, ISO/RTO is a nonprofit organization which is
responsible for integrating a diverse mix of power resources into the power grid and
coordinating generation and consumption. As a fair power grid operator, ISO/RTO
has no financial interest in any market segment and different resources have an equal
access to the transmission network. There are 9 ISO/RTOs in North America—
California ISO (CAISO), Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO), Independent
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Electricity System Operator (IESO), Midcontinent ISO (MISO), Southwest Power
Pool (SPP), Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), ISO New England, New
York ISO, and PJM Interconnection.
An ISO/RTO has a full model of the generation and transmission schedules to
manage and avoid real-time congestions. An ISO/RTO also provides an integrated
forward market (IFM) for trading and analyzing the electricity bids, transmission,
capacity, and reserves needed to maintain grid stability. Additionally, the locational
marginal price (LMP) is calculated by the ISO/RTO based on the cost of electricity
generation and delivery.
Compared to regulated electricity markets, the presence of ISO/RTO has a few
benefits:
Enhanced Reliability: Since ISO/RTO is in charge of a large geographic area,
and the market reliability can be improved through resource sharing, that allows
excessive electricity in a local area to be transmitted to neighboring areas via an
open market. The use of advanced technology and market-driven incentives improves
the performance of power plants. Power plants tend to have lower outage rates in
the unregulated market than in the monopoly market, because power plants have the
motivations to keep the generators on line, especially during peak hours, to maximize
their revenues.
Price Transparency: The LMP mechanism creates a highly transparent system
that calculates the prices based on the cost of electricity generation and delivery. In
a monopoly market, customers and investors face the “black box” pertaining to the
information of prices and the locational cost of transmission, which inhibits invest-
ments in the grid.
Green Resources Integration: ISO/RTO offers a fair platform for diverse elec-
tricity resources to compete with each other, bringing the cheapest electricity to
customers. This non-discriminatory access to power grid opens doors for the low cost
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renewable energy.
Market Monitoring: ISO/RTO plays a significant role in monitoring the electricity
market. ISO/RTO calculates the LMP which truly reflects the supply and demand
relationship. In addition, ISO/RTO can identify ineffective market rules and tariff
provisions, identify potential anticompetitive market behaviors by participants and
offer comprehensive market analysis to help in informed decisions.
Market Flexibility and Diversity: The organized markets offer various electricity
products and financial instruments which can be used to hedge price risks. Because
average real-time energy prices are correlated to short-term forward bilateral prices,
ISO and RTO markets foster forward contracting to stabilize prices. There are usually
numerous sellers and buyers in the electricity wholesale market. Any entity can
participate in the market if they satisfy the basic requirements.
Demand Response: The ISO/RTO has access to power grid operation data, elec-
tricity usage data, generation and demand data. Facilitated by these data, the
ISO/RTO can make informed decisions on pricing or set other rules to alter cus-
tomer’s usage behavior and shape the demand profile to optimize the grid.
As a core optimization algorithm used by ISO/RTO, Security Constrained Unit
Commitment (SCUC) algorithm aims to determine the unit commitment (UC) and
economic energy dispatch by taking into account the supply/demand bids, the an-
cillary service requirement, the transmission congestion and power balance. SCUC
algorithm is used in the day-ahead market and the real-time market. SCUC algo-
rithm employs Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) to effectively solve the optimiza-
tion problem with various model requirements and constraints. The objective of
SCUC algorithm is to minimize the overall cost of energy generation and ancillary
services.
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min
T∑
h=1
N∑
i=1
[
SUCi(1− Ui,h−1)Ui,h +MLCi,hUi,h +
∫ Pi,h
Pmin,i
Ci,h (Pi,h) dP
+ CRUi,h ·RUi,h + CRDi,h ·RDi,h + CSPi,h · SPi,h + CNSi,h ·NSi,h
]
,
(2.1)
where
h: Hour index
T : Total number of hours
i: Resource index
N : Total number of resources
Pi,h: Power output of resource i in hour h
RUi,h: Regulation up provided by resource i in hour h
RDi,h: Regulation down provided by resource i in hour h
SPi,h: Spinning reserve provided by resource i in hour h
NSi,h: Nonspinning reserve provided by resource i in hour h
Ci,h(Pi,h): Cost ($/hour) as a piece-wise linear function of output (MW) for re-
source i in hour h
CRUi,h : Bid cost ($/MW) of regulation up (MW) for resource i in hour h
CRDi,h : Bid cost ($/MW) of regulation down (MW) for resource i in hour h
CSPi,h : Bid cost ($/MW)of spinning reserve (MW) for resource i in hour h
CNSi,h : Bid cost ($/MW) of non-spinning reserve (MW) for resource i in hour h
SUCi: Start-Up Cost ($/start) for resource i
MLCi,h: Minimum Load Cost ($/hour) for resource i in hour h
Ui,h: Commitment status — 0 if resource i is off-line, and 1 if resource i is online,
in hour h
The constraints considered in SCUC encompass the power balance constraint,
the ancillary service constraint, the transmission network constraint, and the inter-
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temporal constraint.
All ISO/RTOs have similar operation procedures to clear day-ahead market. In
this section, we use CAISO as an example to demonstrate how the day-ahead whole-
sale market operates under the coordination of an ISO/RTO. Through three pro-
gressive stages (market power mitigation, integrated forward market, residual unit
commitment), CAISO receives buy bids and sell offers, guarantees that the supply
meets the demand, clears the prices and settles the transactions.
Market Power Mitigation (MPM): The ISO/RTO market aims to encourage com-
petitive and efficient electricity consumption by ensuring that power generation offers
are consistent with their marginal cost and the use of least costly centralized dispatch.
The scheme of MPM are designed to ensure that the power generators are able to bid
on their marginal costs, but not able to exercise market power. Market power is the
ability of a provider to profitably raise the market price of a good or a service. End
customers may suffer from electricity price rises if the power generators can exercise
their market power to manipulate market prices.
Basically, there are two approaches to market power mitigation—“structural” ap-
proach and “conduct and impact” approach [35]. CAISO adopts the structural ap-
proach. For structural approach, generator offers are subject to mitigation if certain
conditions are met. CAISO uses a formula to determine whether a given transmis-
sion constraint is structurally competitive or non-competitive. If the three largest
resources available are jointly necessary to meet a given constraint relief demand,
these three resources fail the test. Resources that fail the test in CAISO are miti-
gated to their reference level offers, which consist of a marginal cost estimate plus a
ten percent adder. These rules are able to force the power generators to offer their
bids close the short-term marginal cost to avoid being mitigated.
The internal monitor of CAISO will calculate the reference levels for incremental
electricity offers, which are marginal cost plus a 10% adder. Reference level calcu-
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lation is based on many factors that include fuel prices and heat rates, a resource’s
lowest previous offers, lowest previous prices at a resource’s node, and opportunity
cost.
Integrated Forward Market (IFM): In an IFM, ISO/RTO analyzes the energy and
ancillary services market to calculate the transmission capacity needed (congestion
management) and confirm the reserves to balance the supply and demand according
to supply and demand bids. It guarantees that the generation plus imports equals
to the load plus exports plus transmission losses. The ISO/RTO employs the LMP
mechanism to calculate the market prices based on bids/offers submitted by buyers
and sellers.
Locational Marginal Price (LMP): It is a mechanism to manage transmission con-
gestion using market-based prices. LMP differs from place to place if transmission
congestion occurs. Transmission congestion prevents the electricity of low-cost gener-
ators from satisfying all the loads and clearing the market. As a result, the low-cost
generators have to ramp down to avoid transmission congestion. In essence, LMP
is the marginal cost of supplying, at the least cost, the next increment of power de-
mand at a specific location (node) in the power system, taking into account both the
supply (generation or import) bids and the demand (load or export) offers and the
physical characteristics of the transmission system and other operation constraints
[36]. Sometimes LMP is also called the “node price”.
The calculation of LMP is based on basic economic theory and power operation
practice. The ISO/RTO determines the LMP at each node by maximizing the total
social surplus under the transmission constraints and power losses. The total social
surplus consists of the supplier surplus and the consumer surplus.
The supply curve in Fig. 2.2 represents the marginal cost of supply. The y-axis
P (Q∗) corresponds to the minimum price-per-unit that the supplier hopes to be paid
to produce the next increment Q at the point of Q∗. The area under the curve up to
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Q∗ is the total cost ($/h) of producing the quantity Q∗. In addition, the supply curve
is monotone increasing. If the total quantity of Q∗ is priced at P (Q∗), the green area
shown in Fig. 2.2 is the supplier surplus. The total revenue for selling Q∗ quantity
is at least P (Q∗)×Q∗ since the price can be greater than P (Q∗). Suppose the total
revenue is P (Q∗) × Q∗, then the supplier surplus (area of upper triangle) equals to
total revenue minus the total cost to supply (area of lower triangle).
The demand curve in Fig. 2.3 represents the marginal benefit of demand. The
y-aix P (Q∗) corresponds to the price-benefit-per unit the consumer is willing to pay
to consume the next increment of Q at point Q∗. The area under the curve up
to Q∗ is the total benefits ($/h) to consume quantity Q∗. Also, the demand curve
is monotone decreasing. If the total quantity of Q∗ is priced at P (Q∗), the solid
area shown is the customer surplus and represents the extra benefit the consumer
acquires to consume the quantity Q∗. The total payment for Q∗ is P (Q∗)×Q∗ or less.
Suppose the total payment is P (Q∗) × Q∗, which is the area of the bottom square.
The consumer surplus (area of upper triangle) = the total benefits (upper triangle +
bottom square) minus total payment (the bottom square).
The total social surplus is the sum of the supplier surplus and the consumer
surplus. As is shown in Fig. 2.4, the intersection of the demand curve and supply
curve gives us the marginal clearing price, and the total social surplus is maximized
under the condition that total supply equals total demand.
The ISO/RTO follows the same economic theory to calculate LMP, except that
the transmission constraints, power grid operation practices, and transmission losses
make the calculation more sophisticated. In this case, the incremental generator
supply bids become the supply curve, and the decremental demand bids become
the demand curve. LMP calculation is much more complex than the simple supply-
demand curve relationship due to all transmission and other operation constraints.
The transmission constraints and losses prevent the lowest-cost electricity from being
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Figure 2.2. Supplier Surplus
Figure 2.3. Customer Surplus
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Figure 2.4. Social Surplus
delivered to all nodes, leading to LMP varying from location to location.
Residual Unit Commitment (RUC): In the integrated forward market, the ISO/RTO
clears the prices and volumes by maximizing the total social surplus. If the clearing
volume does not meet the forecast demand, the ISO/RTO needs to procure additional
capacity from other markets to be available in real-time using the residual unit com-
mitment process. This process ensures that there are enough capacity online to meet
the forecast demand. All generators committed to residual unit commitment must
be available online and submit an energy bit in the real-time market. The Resource
Adequacy (RA) program developed by CAISO guarantees that load serving entities
have at least 115% of the peak-hour demand available as capacity.
The real-time market opens when the results of the day-ahead market are pub-
lished, and closes 75 minutes prior the trading hour. The real-time market consists
of several processes: (1) the market power mitigation process; (2) the hour-ahead
scheduling process; (3) real-time unit commitment (RTUC); (4) the fifteen-minute
market; (5) the real-time dispatch (RTD).
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Market Power Mitigation (MPM): Similar to MPM in day-ahead market, the
real-time market employs MPM to create a valid bid-pool for real-time market opti-
mization. MPM runs every 15 minutes and the determination of MPM is based on
the non-competitive congestion test.
Hour-Ahead Scheduling Process (HASP): HASP is a special run of the real-time
unit commitment process. HASP produces (1) advisory schedules for internal pric-
ing nodes and intertie resources that do not have hourly block schedules/bids; (2)
final schedules for intertie resources with hourly block bids for energy and ancillary
services. HSAP is run once every hour.
Real-Time Unit Commitment Process (RTUC): RTUC is a continuous process
running at an interval of 15 minutes. This process (1) produces bind and advisory
fifteen-minute market (FMM) awards; (2) issues start-up instructions for fast start
and short start resources; (3) issues shut-down instructions for resources that are
not used in the grid; (4) produces transition decisions for multi-stage generation
resources.
Fifteen Minute Market (FMM): FMM runs every 15 minutes. This process is
responsible for (1) determining financially binding FMM schedules and correspond-
ing LMPs for all Pricing Nodes, including all Scheduling Points; (2) determining
financially and operationally binding Ancillary Services Awards and corresponding
ASMPs procure required additional Ancillary Services and calculating ASMP; (3)
determining LAP LMPs.
Real-Time Dispatch (RTD): RTD uses a Security Constrained Economic Dis-
patch (SCED) algorithm every 5 minutes throughout the trading hour to determine
the optimal dispatch instructions to balance supply and demand. RTD can operate
in three modes: RTED (real-time economic dispatch), RTCD (real-time contingency
dispatch) and RTMD (real-time manual dispatch).
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2.3.3 Interplay between EV Charging and Power System
In this section, we consider the interaction between EV charging and the power
system. In particular, we discuss the impact of EV charging on the power system.
Additionally, we will investigate how EVs can be used as mobile energy storage to
inject electricity into power grid via the emerging V2G technology.
Grid-to-Vehicle (G2V): Challenge and Opportunity of Power Grid: The principal
task of the power grid is to deliver economical and reliable electricity to end cus-
tomers. Nevertheless, many studies have shown that simultaneous large-scale EV
charging can disrupt the normal operation of the existing power system with respect
to frequency variation, voltage imbalance, and severe power loss [37–39]. In regards
to power supply, [6, 8, 12–14, 40] have shown that the existing power generators can
support up to 30% to 40% PEV penetration rate without increasing generation capac-
ity if the EV charging is optimally scheduled. Additionally, large-scale EV charging
can also overload the distribution network [41–47]. [48, 49] have demonstrated that
high EV charging demand causes temperature increase and the AD-DC conversion
of EV can lead to harmonic distortion, which will shorten the life span of upstream
components like transformers and cables.
Generally, voltage and frequency are considered as the major variables to assess
the power quality. The frequency of a generator is calculated using the following
formula.
f =
PN
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, (2.2)
where P is the number of stator pole pairs in the rotor, N is the rotational speed of
the rotor in rpm (revolutions per minute).
To maintain a constant frequency, the consumption and generation of active power
should always be balanced. For instance, if the consumption exceeds the generation
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at any time, then the extra power is supplied by the rotational inertia of the generator
by decreasing the speed, which results in the downward drift of frequency [50].
Literature abounds in addressing EV charging scheduling. In [51–55], the authors
have proposed different frameworks to coordinate EV charging to ensure stable and
economical operation of the power grid. To protect the distribution network from
overloading, various strategies have been proposed, e.g., demand response [56], time
of use meters, and resource scheduling algorithms [41, 57, 58].
In addition, the EV charging service provider can benefit from the burgeoning
EV charging market. As the EV charging market rises, the EV charging stations
are expected to gradually take over the market from the conventional gas stations.
The charging service provider can make a good deal of profit by providing charging
service to EVs. According to Navigant Research, global revenue from EVSE charging
services will grow from $81.1 million in 2014 to $2.9 billion by 2023.
Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G): Challenge and Opportunity of Power Grid: In addition to
drawing electricity from the power system, EVs can also inject electricity into the
system through a bidirectional power flow channel. Various studies [13, 59–65] have
shown that the battery packs on EVs can be utilized as mobile energy storage, which
inject electricity into the power system to provide ancillary services, like frequency
regulation, spinning reserve, voltage control, reactive power compensation, etc. EV
owners receive payments from the power aggregators by selling electricity to the
power system, therefore, reducing the overall operation cost of EVs [66–70]. Studies
[37, 71–74] have explored how to employ EVs to mitigate the power fluctuation arising
from intermittent renewable energy generation. [75] have conducted a survey on cus-
tomers’ willingness to pay for V2G, and their findings suggest that the V2G concept
is more inclined to be accepted if the power aggregators offer either pay-as-you-go
service or advanced cash payment. The V2G communication protocols were devel-
oped and tested in report [76]. Additionally, the V2G concept has been implemented
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and validated using hardware and software simulator in [74, 77–80]. Centralized and
decentralized V2G mechanisms have been implemented at University of Delaware
[77]. A testbed of V2G for frequency regulation and energy storage in PJM system
has been developed in [78].
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Figure 2.5. Vehicle to Grid Mechanism
Although the electricity from EV battery packs is more costly than that from
power plants (e.g., $ 0.30/kWh versus $ 0.05/kWh), it is still a compelling alternative
to provide ancillary services because the price of power in ancillary consists of two
parts—capacity price and energy price. If an EV is committed to provide ancillary
services, the payment includes a capital price for being available to quickly respond
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to power grid signals, and an energy price for the actual energy output. Basically, the
V2G exhibits several advantages over the power plants in providing ancillary services:
(1) the capital cost of generation or storage equipment for V2G is low, (2) V2G can
respond quickly, and (3) V2G has the ability to operate in the V2G mode without
serious maintenance penalties.
While V2G has the aforementioned advantages, it has two main limitations,
namely, battery degradation and DC/AC power conversion loss. Note that frequent
charging and discharging will reduce the battery’s life span. Therefore, battery degra-
dation cost is an important factor that cannot be neglected in V2G. [59] presents a
formula to assess battery degradation cost.
cd =
cbat
LET
=
Escb + c1t1
LCEsDoD
, (2.3)
where cbat is the battery replacement cost in US dollars (capital and labor costs),
LET is the the battery lifetime energy throughput for a particular cycling regime
in kWh, Es is the battery capacity in kWh, cb is the cost of battery replacement
in in US$/kWh, c1 is the cost of labor in US$/h, t1 is the labor time for battery
replacement, LC is the battery lifetime in cycles, and DoD is the maximum discharge
rate of battery, usually usually 80% for NiMH and 100% for Li-Ion batteries.
Additionally, there are several challenges to implement V2G, such as the coordi-
nation between EVs and power grid, pricing, hardware, power quality assurance, etc.
In summary, while V2G may seem like a viable alternative energy source for power
generation, its realization may still be quite some time away.
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CHAPTER 3
PLACEMENT OF EV CHARGING STATIONS — BALANCING THE
BENEFITS AMONG MULTIPLE ENTITIES
3.1 Overview
In a study of placement of electric vehicle (EV) charging stations, this section
proposes a multi-stage placement policy with incremental EV penetration rates. A
nested logit model will be employed to analyze the charging preference of the in-
dividual consumer (EV owner), and predict the aggregated charging demand at the
charging stations. The EV charging industry is assumed to be an oligopoly where the
entire market is dominated by several charging service providers (oligopolists). We
plan to use the Bayesian game to model the strategic interactions among the service
providers and derive the optimal placement policy at the beginning of each planning
stage. To derive the optimal placement policy, we consider both the transportation
network graph and electric power network graph. In addition, we also propose to
develop a simulation software—EV Virtual City 1.0 using Java to investigate the in-
teractions among the consumers (EV owner), the transportation network graph, the
electric power network graph, and the charging stations.
3.2 Motivation and Related Work
The continued technological innovations in battery and electric drivetrain have
made electric vehicles (EVs) a viable solution for a sustainable transportation sys-
tem. Currently, most EV charging is done either at residences, or for free at some
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public charging infrastructure provided by municipalities, office buildings, etc. As
the EV industry continues to grow, many more commercial charging stations need
to be strategically added and placed. Development of effective management and
regulation of EV charging infrastructure needs to consider the benefits of multiple
constituencies–consumers, charging station owners, power grid operators, local gov-
ernment, etc. In this section, we propose a placement policy aiming at striking a
balance among the profits of charging station owners, consumer satisfaction, and
power grid’s reliability.
Our work is motivated by the desire of those service providers to make a forward-
looking decision on charging station placement to obtain a good return on the invest-
ment. We plan to use the most up-to-date information (i.e., travel pattern, traffic
flow, road network, power grid, etc.) to make the best-effort decisions on charging
station placement, hoping that service providers will have a good chance to profit
over the next few years. In this model, we do not consider some factors like uncer-
tainties in fuel prices, climate change, population migration etc., which are random
and unpredictable in a long period of time. Instead, we believe some revenue man-
agement techniques (i.e., realtime pricing) may be applied to deal with the potential
effects of those factors in our future work.
We assume that the service providers aim to strike a balance between the compet-
ing goals of maximizing the profits and minimizing the disturbance to electric power
network due to large-scale EV charging. Accordingly, we construct a utility func-
tion that incorporates both the total profits and the impacts of EV charging on the
electric power grid. Each charging service provider attempts to maximize their own
expected utility function while satisfying the Quality-of-Service (QoS) constraints
through choosing the optimal locations of charging station. Note that consumers
usually have different preferences (tastes) over certain products and services. The
nested logit model will be used to analyze and predict the charging preference of EV
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owners. As the EV penetration rate increases, the existing charging stations may no
longer satisfy the QoS constraints and a new stage shall be initiated to place more
charging stations. At the beginning of each stage, the service providers predict the
charging demand of each charging station candidate using the nested logit model.
The optimal placement strategy is obtained through a Bayesian game.
There is a growing literature addressing the issues relevant to EV charging station
placement. [81–84] formulated charging station placement as an optimization prob-
lem. However, they did not take into account the overall consumer satisfaction and
the impacts of EV charging on electric power network in their works. Besides, their
optimization models were formulated from the perspective of a central urban planner
rather than that of service providers in a free competitive market. In [85], the authors
presented a strategy to deploy charging stations by analyzing the patterns of residen-
tial EV ownership and driving activities. In their work, they deploy the new charging
stations either randomly with no weight or only based on the weights of population.
They did not consider the mobility of EVs and the overall consumer experience.
Bernardo et al. [86] proposed a discrete choice model (DCM) based framework to
study the optimal locations for fast charging stations. They treat each charging sta-
tion as a player in a noncooperative game. However, the underlying assumption in
their work is that each player has complete information about other players, which
is too restrictive and infeasible in a practical competitive market. In this section, we
propose a Bayesian game framework that does not require the complete information
of other players.
The main contributions of our work are summarized as follows:
• A multi-stage charging station placement strategy with incremental EV pene-
tration rates is first formulated, which takes into account the interactions among
EVs, road network, and the electric power grid.
• A nested logit model is then employed to characterize the overall consumer sat-
isfaction and predict the aggregated charging demand, which provides insights
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into the preferences and decision-making processes of EV owners.
• An oligopolistic market model of EV charging service providers is studied and a
Bayesian game framework is applied to analyze the strategic interactions among
service providers.
• A simulation software has been developed to analyze the interplay among EV
owners, road network, power grid, urban infrastructure and charging stations.
3.3 Preliminaries on Oligopoly and Consumer Behavior Analytics
In this section, we will introduce basic knowledge on oligopoly and consumer
behavior analytics.
3.3.1 Oligopoly Market
An oligopoly [87, 88] is a market form which is dominated by a small number of
sellers (oligopolists). Oligopoly can reduce competition and lead to higher prices for
consumers through different forms of collusion. In contrast to oligopoly, monopoly
is a market form which is controlled by a single seller. There are many oligopolistic
market examples, such as the Pepsi and Coke in the soft drink industry and the four
wireless providers in US—Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint. The retail gasoline
market is another example of an oligopoly because a small number of firms control a
large majority of the gasoline market.
For this type of market, each oligopolist is aware of the actions of the other
oligopolists, and the decisions of one oligopolist can significantly affect or be affected
by others. According to game theory, strategic planning by oligopolists needs to take
into account the possible responses of the other market participants.
Characteristics of Oligopoly: Oligopoly has several characteristics:
• Profit maximizer: An oligopolist maximizes its profits.
• Ability to set price: Oligopolies all have the market power to set the prices.
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• Entry and exit: The cost to enter the market can be high. The most important
barriers are government regulation, patents, key technologies, and strategic
actions from incumbent firms to impede the entry of nascent firms.
• Product differentiation: The product in an oligopoly can be homogeneous (i.e.
steel, gasoline) or differentiated (i.e. wireless services, automobile).
• Knowledge about each other: Oligopolists have perfect knowledge about their
own production and demand. However, usually the information about other
oligopolists are incomplete.
• Strategic interaction: An oligopoly consists of a few giant companies. Each
oligopolist’s action can influence the price of the entire market. Therefore, an
oligopolist will take into account the possible actions of the other oligopolists
when determine its own actions.
Outcomes of Oligopoly: The competition among the oligopolists can result in
different outcomes depending on how they interact with other. In some markets, the
firms may employ very restrictive transaction practices (collusion, market sharing
etc.) to raise prices and restrict production in much the same way as a monopoly.
An example of such oligopoly market structure is the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), which can greatly impact on the international price
of oil. In some markets, there may exist a recognized leader who sets the product
price and the other market participants just follow the price. This type of market is
called price leadership. In other markets, the competition among the oligopolists can
be extremely fierce. They compete with each other in prices and productions. This
may ultimately lead to perfect competition.
Mathematical Models of Oligopoly: Various models have been employed to ana-
lyze oligopoly, among which Cournot-Nash model and Betrand model are the most
famous. There are several classic papers comparing and discussing the two models
[89–92].
Cournot model describes a market where the firms compete on the quantities
instead of prices and each firm makes an output decision under the assumption of
the other firm’s output is fixed. The firms will adjust their output quantities in
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response to the other firms’ actions. It may take a series of actions and reactions
before the firms finally reach the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium, in which situation no
firm will change their output quantities given that they are aware the reactions of
the other firms to any changes.
For example, we assume there are two firms in a market which produce homoge-
neous product. Suppose the output of firm 1 is q1 and the output of firm 2 is q2. Since
the two firms produce homogeneous product, the price should be the same when they
reach the Nash Equilibrium. We suppose the equilibrium price is a function of q1 and
q2, i.e. f(q1 + q2). The cost of the two firms are denoted using C1(q1) and C2(q2),
respectively. The profit of each firm is the total revenue minus the cost.
Πj = f(q1 + q2)qj − Cj(qj). (j = 1, 2) (3.1)
The best response is to maximize Πj by finding the optimal qj given that qi is
fixed (i 6= j). Take the first derivative of Πj with respect to qj and set it to zero.
∂Πj
∂qj
= qj
∂f(q1 + q2)
∂qj
+ f(q1 + q2)− ∂Cj(qj)
∂qj
= 0. (3.2)
The value of qj satisfying the equation above is the best responses. The Nash Equi-
libria are the pairs of q1 and q2 are satisfying the set of equations simultaneously.
In contrast to Cournot model, Bertrand model describes an market where the
firms compete with each other in terms of product prices rather than product quan-
tities. We assume there are at least two firms dominating the market, and the firms
will not cooperate with each other. They try to maximize their profits by setting the
optimal prices taking into account the possible pricing policies of the other firms.
Different from Cournot model, we need to consider two cases—homogeneous prod-
uct case and heterogeneous product case in Bertrand model, which lead to very in-
teresting results.
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Homogeneous Product Case: We assume firm 1 and firm 2 produce exactly same
product. For simplicity, we assume the two firms have identical constant marginal cost
function. Let MC represent the marginal cost of producing one unit of the product.
The firms set prices at p1 and p2 with outputs of q1 and q2, respectively. Since the
product is exactly the same, any firm with a lower price will grab all the consumers.
Therefore, the prices of the two firms will be the same when they reach equilibrium,
i.e. p1 = p2 = p, where p is the single market price. Furthermore, we assume the
market demand is expressed by a function q = q(p). Under the equilibrium, firm 1
and firm 2 will split the market demand equally—each firm sells the same amount of
products, q1 = q2 = q/2.
Heterogeneous Product Case: We assume the products of firm 1 and firm 2 are
similar, but not exactly the same. In this case, the prices do not have to be the
same in equilibrium since a lower price does not mean the firm will lose the market.
In addition, we assume the demands of the two firms depend on the two prices:
q1 = q1(p1, p2) and q2 = q2(p1, p2). For the demand function of firm i qi, the partial
derivative with respect to pi should be negative, indicating that the price rise will
result in a decrease in demand and the partial derivative with respect to pj should
be positive, indicating that the price rise of the other firm will result in an increase
in its own demand. The profits of the two firms are given by
Π1 = p1q1(p1, p2)− C1(q1(p1, p2)), (3.3)
and
Π2 = p2q2(p1, p2)− C2(q2(p1, p2)). (3.4)
We take the first derivative of Π1 and Π2 with respect to p1 and p2, respectively.
The best responses of p1 and p2 are obtained by letting the derivatives equal to zero
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and solve the set of equations. This is also called the first-order conditions (FOC).
∂Π1
∂p1
= q1(p1, p2) + p1
∂q1(p1, p2)
∂p1
− ∂C1(q1)
∂q1
∂q1(p1, p2)
∂p1
= 0,
∂Π2
∂p2
= q2(p1, p2) + p2
∂q2(p1, p2)
∂p2
− ∂C2(q2)
∂q2
∂q2(p1, p2)
∂p2
= 0.
(3.5)
We can rewrite it into a more compact way as follows,
∂Π1
∂p1
= q1 + p1
∂q1
∂p1
−MC1 ∂q1
∂p1
= 0,
∂Π2
∂p2
= q2 + p2
∂q2
∂p2
−MC2 ∂q2
∂p2
= 0.
(3.6)
where MC1 and MC2 are the marginal cost of firm 1 and firm 2, respectively.
3.3.2 Consumer Behavior Analytics
In consumer behavior analytics, discrete choice model (DCM) is employed to
characterize, explain, and predict how a consumer will choose a certain product in
the presence of a finite set of alternatives, for instance which car to buy, where to go
to college, and which mode of transportation (bus, taxi, rail) to use to work [93–96].
DCM is a powerful tool that we can use to calculate the probability that a certain
consumer will choose a certain product among a finite set of alternatives. The basic
idea of DCM is that a consumer tries to maximize the total utility when making a
decision in the presence of multiple choice alternatives.
We assume that there are some factors that determine a consumer’s choice. Some
of them are observed by the researchers, but some are not. The observed factors
are labelled as x and the unobserved factors are denoted as  (we can call it the
random term). How these factors influence the choice of a consumer is expressed
using a function y = h(x, ). The function characterizes the behavioral process of
decision making of a consumer. Since  is not observed, the choice of a consumer is
not deterministic and cannot be exactly predicted by researchers. We assume that 
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is a random variable with a probability density function (PDF) f(). The probability
that a consumer chooses a particular product among a finite set of alternatives is just
the probability that the unobserved factor such that the behavioral process results
in the that outcome, i.e. P (y|x) = Prob(s.t.h(x, ) = y). The probability can be
calculated by integration as follows,
P (y|x) = Prob (I[h(x, ) = y] = 1)
=
∫
I[h(x, ) = y]f()d.
(3.7)
where I[h(x, ) = y] is an indicator function which takes value of 1 when the statement
in the brackets is true and value of 0 otherwise.
Nested Logit Model: DCM consists of many models, which encompasses the sim-
ple logit model, the nested logit model, the probit model, and the mixed logit model.
The logit model is the most simple model with the assumption that the unobserved
factors have iid extreme value distribution. Other complex models are developed
based on logit model. In contrast to logit, nested logit model divides the set of alter-
natives into multiple small nests wherein alternatives are correlated and the alterna-
tives across different nests are independent. Probit is derived under the assumption
that the unobserved factors have a joint normal distribution, while the mixed logit
allows the unobserved factors to have any distribution. In this subsection, we will
primarily introduce the nested logit model, which will be utilized to characterize the
EV charging demand in the following sections.
The nested logit model is appropriate for the situation where the set of alternatives
faced by a consumer can be partitioned into several subsets, or nests. The nested
logit model differs from the logit model in that it allows correlations among the
alternatives.
Suppose that a consumer is facing a set of alternatives. Let the alternatives be
partitioned into K non-overlapping nests B1, B2, · · · , BK . The utility that consumer
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n obtains from alternative j in nest Bk is denoted as Unj = Vnj + nj, where Vnj
is observed utility and nj is the unobservable utility. The vector of unobservable
utilities [n1, n2, · · · , nJ ] has the generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution with
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) as follows,
F (n) = exp
(
−
K∑
k=1
(∑
j∈Bk
e−nj/σk
)σk)
, (3.8)
where σk is a measure of the degree of independence in the unobservable utility within
nest Bk. For any alternatives j and i in nest Bk, the unobservable utility nj and ni
are correlated. For any alternatives in different nests, the unobservable utilities are
uncorrelated: Cov(nj, nm) = 0, for j ∈ Bk and m ∈ Bl and k 6= l.
The probability that consumer n will choose alternative j is obtained by taking
the expectation over the unobservable utilities as defined in Eq. (3.9).
Pnj = Prob (Vnj + nj > Vni + ni, ∀i 6= j)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
Fnj(Vnj − Vn1 + nj, Vnj − Vn2 + nj, · · · , Vnj − VnJ + nj)dnj
(3.9)
where Fnj is obtained by taking the derivative of F (n) with respective to nj:
Fnj
∂F (n)
∂nj
. Finally, the integration gives us the probability in the following form.
Pnj =
eVnj/σk
(∑
i∈Bk e
Vni/σk
)σk−1∑K
l=1
(∑
i∈Bl e
Vni/σl
)σl . (3.10)
See Appendix for more detailed derivation of Eq. (3.10).
3.4 Problem Formulation
I postulate the problem of EV charging with an oligopolistic market structure
that has multiple charging service providers (oligopolists). The service providers aim
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to maximize their expected utility while satisfying the QoS constraints by selecting
optimal station placements.
Particularly, we consider the case of three service providers that offer three EV
charging services [33], namely, Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 (see Table 2.1 for de-
tails). Level 1 and Level 2 are AC charging. Level 3 charging is DC Fast charging. Let
O = {1, 2, 3} denote the set of charging service providers. Moreover, we assume that
service provider 1 offers Level 1 charging, service provider 2 offers Level 2 charging,
and service provider 3 offers Level 3 charging. The three charging levels represent
three charging services, which have different charging voltages and currents, charging
times, and charging experiences. In economics, they are imperfect substitutes to each
other. In our model, we are interested in investigating how the different charging ser-
vices compete with each other in choosing locations and prices. Each service provider
can run multiple charging stations. At each planning stage, service providers select
some charging stations from a given set of candidates, denoted as I = {1, 2, 3 · · · , L}.
The set of EVs is denoted as E = {1, 2, 3, · · · , N}.
3.4.1 Profit of EV Charging
We assume that service providers run the charging stations like chain stores, so
charging stations affiliated with the same service provider have the same retail charg-
ing price. The charging stations purchase the electricity from the wholesale market at
the locational marginal price (LMP). In a deregulated electricity market (like PJM,
NYISO, NEISO, MISO, ERCOT, California ISO in USA, the New Zealand and Sin-
gapore markets), LMP is computed at every node (bus) by the market coordinator.
LMP primarily consists of three components: system energy price, transmission con-
gestion cost, and cost of marginal losses [36]. Let pk represent the retail charging
price of provider k (k = 1, 2, 3), and p−k be the retail charging prices of the other two
service providers except k. Let cj,k be the LMP of the jth charging station candidate
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of service provider k, and ψj,k be the predicted charging demand at the jth charging
station candidate of service provider k. The vector Sk = [s1,k, s2,k, · · · , sL,k]T repre-
sents the placement policy of service provider k, where sj,k ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator
with sj,k = 1 implying that service provider k will place the jth charging station. Let
S−k represent the placement policies of the other two service providers, θj,k be the
placement cost of the jth charging station. The total profit of service provider k is
Πk = pkΨ
T
k Sk − diag[Ck]ΨTk Sk −ΘTk Sk, (3.11)
and the total revenue of service provider k is,
Rk = pkΨ
T
k Sk − diag[Ck]ΨTk Sk, (3.12)
where Ψk = [ψ1,k, ψ2,k, ψ3,k, · · · , ψL,k]T, Ck = [c1,k, c2,k, · · · , cL,k]T and
Θk = [θ1,k, θ2,k, · · · , θL,k]T. The notation diag[.] is an operator to create a diagonal
matrix using the underlying vector, and [.]T is the transpose operation. In the equa-
tion above, the total sale is pkΨ
T
k Sk, the cost of purchasing electricity is diag[Ck]Ψ
T
k Sk,
and the placement cost is ΘTk Sk.
3.4.2 Impact of EV Charging on Power Grid
It is conceivable that the simultaneous large-scale EV charging can disrupt the
normal operation of the power grid in terms of frequency variation, voltage imbal-
ance, voltage variation, power loss. In a conventional power grid, the generators will
cooperatively control the output of real power and reactive power to maintain system
stability, perform frequency regulation and voltage regulation. The charging service
providers must optimally place the charging stations to mitigate the “disturbance”
to the power grid. Accordingly, the overall utility function of service provider can be
defined as:
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Uk = Πk − wBk, (3.13)
where Πk is the total profits from EV charging. Bk characterizes the penalty arising
from large-scale EV charging. The variable w is a weighting coefficient, reflecting
the tolerance to the penalty. In the following section, we will further discuss how
to develop a proper metric to evaluate the penalty Bk. We should note that the
weighting factor w in Eq. (3.13) offers a mechanism for the charging service providers
to strike a balance between their own profit and the “stress” their charging add to
the power system. If w = 0, the impact of EV charging on the grid is not considered
at all, and any non-zero value of w implies some impact on the grid—the larger w is,
the larger the impact it is. Generally, if the focus is on the charging provider’s profit,
a small w is used. In practice, the value of w needs to be determined with the help
of heuristic and empirical data.
3.4.3 Quality-of-Service Metrics
We use two quality-of-service (QoS) metrics for the service provider: (1) average
service delay probability Υk, (2) average service coverage Ξk, (k = 1, 2, 3).
Υk =
1
N
N∑
i=1
υi,k, (3.14)
Ξk =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ξi,k, (3.15)
where υi,k is the average service delay probability for the ith EV owner getting the
EV charged at service provider k. For the ith EV owner, υi,k is defined as the ratio of
the number of delayed charging to the total number of charging attempts; ξi,k is the
average number of accessible Level k charging stations along the route from origin
to destination. Notice that υi,k and ξi,k are two random variables depending on the
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travel patterns of all EVs, the urban road network and the charging stations. It is
difficult to use a simple formula to compute them. Instead, we employ Mento Carlo
method to estimate those two values.
3.4.4 Multi-Stage Charging Station Planning Scheme
At each planning stage, the service providers aim at solving the following funda-
mental problem to obtain the optimal placement policy subjected to the QoS con-
straints.
[STk |ST−11 , ST−12 , ST−13 ] =
argmax
s1,k,··· ,sL,k
sj,k∈{0,1}
{
ES−k [Uk]|ST−11 , ST−12 , ST−13
}
,
(3.16)
subject to
Υk ≤ Υ0, (3.17)
Ξk ≤ Ξ0, (3.18)
where ES−k [.] denotes the expectation over S−k, and STk is the placement policy at
stage T . The variables Υ0 and Ξ0 are the predetermined QoS constraints.
3.4.5 Emerging Problems
To solve the optimization problem defined as Eq. (3.16), we are confronted with
three principal questions: (1) How to predict the aggregated charging demand ψj,k
at each charging station candidate? (2) How to find an appropriate metric to charac-
terize the impacts of EV charging on the power grid? (3) How to derive the optimal
placement policy in an easier way? For the first question, we propose to employ
the nested logit model to estimate the charging demand using a nested logit model.
As for the second question, we will discuss the how EV charging may impact the
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power grid, and propose a metric to assess the impacts of EV charging. For the
last question, notice that the optimization problem formulated by Eq. (3.16) is in-
tractable since the optimal placement decision for every service provider also depends
on the decisions taken by other service providers. To this end, we employ a Bayesian
game model to characterize the strategic interaction and price competition among
the service providers.
3.5 EV Charging Demand Estimation
In our model, the aggregated charging demand at a charging station candidate
is defined as the sum of the product of the probability that EV owners choose that
charging station and the electricity required to charge the EVs. The charging behav-
iors of EV owners may be influenced by many factors that include the charging price,
travel cost, amenities at or near the charging station, the travel purpose, EV owner’s
income, etc. We plan to the nested logit model to characterize the attractiveness of
a charging station.
The nested logit model is widely used in the analysis and prediction of a consumers
choice from a finite set of choice alternatives. The main idea of nested logit model is
that a consumer is a utility maximizer. The consumer will choose the very product
which brings him/her the maximum utility.
In our problem, the utility that the nth EV owner can obtain from choosing
charging station j (j = 1, 2, · · · , L) of service provider k (k = 1, 2, 3) is denoted as
Unj,k = U
n
j,k + 
n
j,k, where U
n
j,k is the observable utility and 
n
j,k is the unobservable util-
ity. The vector of unobservable utility n = [n1,1, · · · , nL,1, n1,2, · · · , nL,2, n1,3, · · · , nL,3]T
is assumed to have a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution with cumulative
distribution function (CDF).
51
F (n) = exp
(
−
3∑
k=1
(
L∑
l=1
e−
n
l,k/σk
)σk)
, (3.19)
where σk is a measure of the degree of independence in the unobservable utility
among the charging stations owned by service provider k. For nested logit model, j,k
is correlated within each charging level, and uncorrelated across different charging
levels.
For nested logit model, we can decompose the observable utility U
n
j,k into two
components—the utility of choosing service provider k and the utility of choosing a
charging station j. In addition, we assume home charging is the “outside good” in
this market [95, 97]. Thus, U
n
j,k for EV owner n can be expressed as
U
n
j,k = W
n
k + V
n
j,k, (3.20)
where W
n
k is the observable utility of choosing service provider k (choosing nest k),
and V
n
j,k is the observable utility of choosing charging station j given that service
provider k has been chosen; W
n
k and V j,k are linear weighted combinations of at-
tributes of the charging stations and the EV owner.
Note that the retail charging price and the charging time are the two important
factors differentiating the three charging services. In addition, we assume the income
of EV owners will also play a role in choosing charging services. In contrast to our
previous work [98], we use a different formula to calculate W
n
k here.
W
n
k = α
1
tk
+ β
pk
in
, (3.21)
where tk, pk and in represent, respectively, the averaged charging time, the retail
charging price, and the income of the nth EV owner; α, β are the corresponding
weighting coefficients. This model is similar to Ben-Akiva and Lerman’s utility model
in their study of public transportation mode [96]. The value of α is positive because
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shorter charging time implies a better charging service experience, therefore, leading
to higher utility. The value of β is negative because a higher retail charging price
always results in less utility. However, the retail charging price is divided by the
income, which reflects that the retail charging price for the EV owners becomes
less important as their income increases. As an “outside good”, the utility of home
charging is normalized, i.e. W
n
0 = 0.
Furthermore, we define V
n
j,k as follows,
V
n
j,k =µkd
n
j,k + ηkz
n
j,k + γkrj,k + λkgj,k + δkmj,k, (3.22)
where znj,k is the destination indicator. If the jth charging station is near the EV
owner’s travel destination (within a threshold distance dth), z
n
j,k = 1, otherwise,
znj,k = 0. d
n
j,k is the deviating distance due to EV charging. We use Dijkstra’s shortest
path algorithm [99] to calculate a travel route for each EV owner from his/her origin
to destination. If an EV owner needs to go to charging station j halfway, we define
the deviating distance The variable dnj,k as the route length of this new route minus
the route length of the original route. Additionally, each candidate charging station
has a vector of characteristics [rj,k, gj,k,mj,k]
T, which characterizes the attractiveness
of this charging station in terms of those amenities. For instance, if there exists a
restaurant near location j, rj,k = 1, otherwise rj,k = 0. Similarly, gj,k and mj,k are
the indicators for shopping center and supermarket, respectively. The corresponding
weighting coefficients are µk, ηk, γk, λk, δk.
The EV owner’s choice is not deterministic due to the random unobservable util-
ity. However, we can derive the probability that an EV owner will choose a certain
charging station by taking the expectation over the unobservable utilities. Similar
to Eq. (3.10), the probability that the nth EV owner will choose the jth charging
station of service provider k is
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Φnj,k =
eU
n
j,k/σk
(∑L
l=1 e
U
n
l,k/σk
)σk−1
∑3
t=1
(∑L
l=1 e
U
n
l,t/σt
)σt . (3.23)
All coefficients in the nested logit model can be estimated and calibrated from
preference survey data. The nested logit model enables us to compute the probability
that an EV owner will go to a certain charging station, even though, an EV owner’s
decision may not always comply with the calculated probabilities. An individual EV
owner may go to a fixed charging station at his/her discretion. However, employing
the nested logit model provides a statistically meaningful prediction for the charging
demand based on ensemble averages.
Once the EV owners’ choice probability is computed, we can predict the charging
demand of a charging station. Let qn (n = 1, 2, · · · , N) denote the total electricity
(measured in kWh) that the nth EV owner purchases from the charging station, and
qn is a random variable uniformly distributed in the range [Qa, Qb], where Qa and
Qb are, respectively, the lower and upper limit of charging demand for all EVs. The
total predicted charging demand of charging station j of service provider k is
ψj,k =
N∑
n=1
qnΦ
n
j,k. (3.24)
3.6 Impact of EV Integration on Power Grid
The main function of the power grid is to deliver electricity to users reliably and
economically. However, large-scale EV integration can potentially disrupt the normal
operation of power grid in terms of system stability, severe power loss, frequency
variation, voltage imbalance, etc. Generally, the variations in voltage and frequency
of electricity are considered as the major factors to characterize the power quality.
Assume that the power system has M generators and D buses (substations), and
the power flow study approach [100] is applied to solve the voltage, real power, and
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reactive power in the power system. Consider the node power equations, which can
be written as real and reactive power for each bus.
0 = −Pi +
N∑
k=1
|vi||vk|(Gik cosφik +Bik sinφik), (3.25)
0 = −Qi +
N∑
k=1
|vi||vk|(Gik sinφik −Bik cosφik), (3.26)
where Pi and Qi are, respectively, the injected real power and reactive power at bus
i. The variable Gik is the real part of the element in the bus admittance matrix
corresponding to the ith row and kth column, and Bik is the imaginary part of the
element. φik is the voltage angle between the ith bus and the kth bus. |vi| and |vk|
are the voltage magnitudes at bus i and bus k, respectively.
Generally, the power plants hope that the load is predictable and stable (or at
least slow-varying). If the load fluctuates too much, the power plants have to ramp up
and ramp down frequently, resulting in low efficiency and high cost from committing
spinning reserve [101]. Therefore, the fluctuation of the active power and reactive
power at the generators with and without EV charging can be used as a metric to
evaluate this “stress”. In particular, we use the 2-norm deviation of generating power
(real power and reactive power) of all generators in the power system to calculate the
impacts of EV charging.
B = ||Pbaseg −PEVg ||22 + ||Qbaseg −QEVg ||22, (3.27)
where Pbaseg = [P
base
1 , P
base
2 , · · · , P baseM ] is a vector representing the active power gen-
erated by the M generators under the base power load scenario (without EV charg-
ing), and PEVg = [P
EV
1 , P
EV
2 , · · · , PEVM ] is the vector of active power with EV charg-
ing (i.e., base power load superposed by EV charging load). Similarly, Qbaseg =
[Qbase1 , Q
base
2 , · · · , QbaseM ] is the vector of reactive power of the base load, and QEVg =
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[QEV1 , Q
EV
2 , · · · , QEVM ] is the vector of reactive power with EV charging. For a specific
power system, Pbaseg ,P
EV
g ,Q
base
g , and Q
EV
g can be calculated through solving global
power flow.
3.7 Spatial Competition and Optimal Placement through a Bayesian Game
It is pivotal for firms to choose the right location and product to compete with
rivals in the same industry. Business locations will affect business competition, and
conversely intensive competition will affect how firms choose the appropriate loca-
tions. One question arises naturally is whether or not firms from the same industry
like to cluster their stores. There are some classical literature on spatial competi-
tion, e.g. Hotelling’s location model [102] and Salop’s circle model [97]. Firms have
incentives for both clustering and separation. On one hand, firms prefer clustering
so that they can learn from each other on how to improve manufacturing and re-
search productivity [103, 104], and learn demand from each other to reduce the cost
of searching for the optimal location. Firms also cluster for the labor pool and sup-
plies. In addition, firms can benefit from the spinoffs that are located near parent
firms. On the other hand, the fear of intensive price competition due to clustering
may motivate the firms to separate from each other.
The EV charging service providers face the similar dilemma. Therefore, we need
to investigate how the service providers will interact with each other in choosing their
charging station locations and setting the retail charging prices. In practice, the exact
placement costs and utility functions of the competing service providers may not be
known to the service provider a priori. We thus formulate the problem as a Bayesian
game [105] among the service providers at each planning stage.
The main components of a Bayesian game include a set of players I, a strategy
space Sk, a type space Θk, a payoff function uk, and a joint probability of the types
f(Θ1,Θ2,Θ3). We will construct the utility function of each service provider. The
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Bayesian Nash Equilibirum (BNE) of charging station placement strategy can be
derived by the first order of conditions (FOC).
Before proceeding to analyze the Bayesian game, we need the following assump-
tions.
Assumption 1: f(S−k) is binomially distributed with parameter 0.5, i.e. S−k v
Binomial(2L, 0.5).
Remark 1: The distribution of S−k reflects player k’s conjecture on how other
players will act during the game. Each player can form their conjectures about other
players according to their beliefs about the competitors. For instance, a player may
be risk neutral, risk aversion or risk seeking. For simplicity, we assume that S−k has
a binomial distribution with parameter 0.5. However, the theoretical analysis can be
applied to any other distribution of S−k.
Assumption 2: All service providers in the market are Bertrand competitors.
Remark 2: Bertrand competitors are players that do not cooperate with each
other. Their goal is to maximize their own utility. They will not form any type of
“coalition” to manipulate the market.
For each player, the Bayesian Nash Equilibirum (BNE) of placement policy can
be derived from Eq. (3.16). To solve Equation (3.16), we need to know the retail
charging prices of all the service providers. In a Bertrand competition, the retail prices
for every combination of the charging station placement policies are determined by
the first order of conditions (FOC):
∂Π1
∂p1
=
N∑
n=1
L∑
j=1
qnsj,1
[
Φnj,1 + (p1 − cj,1)
∂Φnj,1
∂p1
]
= 0 (3.28)
∂Π2
∂p2
=
N∑
n=1
L∑
j=1
qnsj,2
[
Φnj,2 + (p2 − cj,2)
∂Φnj,2
∂p2
]
= 0 (3.29)
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∂Π3
∂p3
=
N∑
n=1
L∑
j=1
qnsj,3
[
Φnj,3 + (p3 − cj,3)
∂Φnj,3
∂p3
]
= 0 (3.30)
where cj,1, cj,2, and cj,3 represent the LMP at each charging station candidate.
Remark 3: For simulation simplicity, we assume the charging stations affiliated
to the same service provider have the same retail charging prices (p1, p2, and p3).
However, our analysis can be easily generalized to the case where each charging
station sets its own retail price. Note that those retail prices obtained from Eq.
(3.28)-(3.30) may not be the real-time prices used in practice. They are only the
equilibrium prices in this market under the assumption of Bertrand competition.
They can be interpreted as the averaged charging prices of the service providers
over a long period of time. In practice, the service providers take turns to set the
retail price in response to the prices of the competitors. Additionally, if some of the
other factors change (i.e. consumer’s preference, crude oil price soaring, etc.), the
existing equilibrium breaks and a new equilibrium must be computed using the same
procedure.
Theorem 1 [Strategy Decision Condition]: Service provider k will choose place-
ment policy l(l = 1, 2, 3, · · · , 2L) if the type space Θk falls into the hypervolume
specified by
H(l) =
{Θk ∈ RL+ : ΘTk (Sk,j − Sk,l)− (ERk,j − ERk,l)
+ w(Bk,j −Bk,l) > 0;∀j 6= l},
(3.31)
where Sk,j and Sk,l denote the placement strategy j and l, respectively. ERk,j and
ERk,l denote the expected total revenue with deployment strategy j and l, respec-
tively.
Proof. Each service provider has L location candidates, so there are 2L different
placement policies. The type space can be seen as an L-dimensional space, and
Θk = [θ1,k, θ2,k, · · · , θL,k]T represents a point in this space.
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By Eq. (3.16), strategy l is optimal if
E[Rk,l]−ΘTk Sk,l − wBk,l > E[Rk,j]−
ΘTk Sk,j − wBk,j; (j = 1, 2, · · · , 2L, j 6= l).
(3.32)
Rearranging the terms, we get
ΘTk (Sk,j − Sk,l)− (ERk,j − ERk,l)+
w(Bk,j −Bk,l) > 0; (j = 1, 2, · · · , 2L, j 6= l),
(3.33)
where each inequality represents a hyperplane and the intersection of all the inequal-
ities defines a hypervolume in the type space.
3.8 Simulation Platform Development and Case Study
We propose to develop a general-purpose simulation software—The EV Virtual
City 1.0 using Repast [106]. Our simulation software is designed to construct a vir-
tual digital city by integrating a variety of data and information, such as geographic
information, demographic information, spatial infrastructure data, urban road net-
work graph, electric power network graph, travel pattern, diurnal variation in traffic
flow, seasonal fluctuation of driving activities, social interaction, etc. The platform is
flexible that one can include or exclude many modules to satisfy different simulation
needs. See Fig. 3.1 for the architecture of the simulation software.
We will conduct a case study using the data of San Pedro District of Los Angeles.
We import the shapefiles of zip code tabulation area (ZCTA) and road network
data from the U.S. Census Bureau into our simulation software. In addition, we
have calculated the centroids of locations of residence, restaurants, supermarkets,
shopping centers and workplaces using Google Maps, see Fig. 3.2.
Since travel pattern also plays a significant role in analysing the charging behavior
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Figure 3.1. The Architecture of The EV Virtual City 1.0
Figure 3.2. Roads and Buildings of San Pedro District
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of EV owners, it is necessary to have a thorough study on the statistics of travel
pattern. From the 2009 National Household Travel Survey (2009 NHTS) [107], we
obtained the travel pattern statistics. See Fig. 3.3.
Figure 3.3. The Statistics of Travel Patterns
From the California Energy Commission website, we obtained the maps of trans-
mission line and substations of San Pedro District. This area has 107 substations
in total. Thus we use the IEEE 118-bus power system test case in our simulation.
For each charging station placement policy, we used MATPOWER [108] to calculate
the LMP of each bus and the output power of each generator with and without EV
charging. See Fig. 3.4.
A snapshot of the moving EVs is shown in Fig. 3.5. Each red star represents an
EV owner. The traffic flow heatmap of EV owners is also plotted in this figure. Figs.
3.6 to 3.9 correspond to the charging station placement for stages 1 to 4, respectively.
Fig. 3.10 is an overview of charging station placement by superposing Figs. 3.6 to 3.9.
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Figure 3.4. IEEE 118-Bus Power System Test Case
Figure 3.5. A Snapshot of EVs Movement
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Fig. 3.11 shows how the number of charging station increases as the EV penetration
rate increases.
Figure 3.6. Stage 1 Placement
3.9 Conclusion
From the simulation results, we can make the following observations:
1. The optimal charging station deployment is consistent with the EV traffic flow
heatmap. This suggests that our model can adequately capture the mobility of EVs
and provide EV owners with convenient charging services.
2. As for the number of charging stations, Level 1 charging station is predominant
over Level 2 and Level 3. Level 3 has the least number of charging stations. Notice
that it takes a much longer time to finish charging for Level 1, so Level 1 service
provider must place more charging stations to meet the average delay probability
constraint. The difference in quantity also reveals that the service providers have
different marketing strategies. Service provider 1 tries to place the charging stations
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Figure 3.7. Stage 2 Placement
Figure 3.8. Stage 3 Placement
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Figure 3.9. Stage 4 Placement
Figure 3.10. Superimposing All Stages
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Figure 3.11. Charging Station verses EV Penetration Rate
evenly across the entire area, while service provider 3 is more likely to place the
charging stations at some “hot” locations.
3. The number of charging stations grows almost linearly with the number of
EVs except for the initial stage. At the initial stage, Level 1 and Level 2 service
providers tend to place more charging stations than the next stages. This is because
service providers must place more charging stations to meet the average service cov-
erage constraints. As the number of charging stations increases, however, the service
coverage constraint is less of a concern for the service providers.
4. Service providers prefer clustering instead of spatial separation. The three
service providers have segmented the EV charging market by providing three different
products (different charging level services) in terms of voltage, current, charging speed
and charging price. Due to product differentiation, they significantly soften the price
competition so that they do not need to spatially separate from each other to further
relax competition. This observation supports the opinions in [109]-[110] that firms do
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not have to maximize differentiation in every characteristic of the product. In general,
differentiation in one dominant characteristic is sufficient to soften price competition.
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CHAPTER 4
STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC PRICING FOR EV CHARGING STATIONS WITH
RENEWABLES INTEGRATION AND ENERGY STORAGE
4.1 Overview
This chapter studies the problem of stochastic dynamic pricing and energy man-
agement policy for electric vehicle (EV) charging service providers. In the pres-
ence of renewable energy integration and energy storage system, EV charging service
providers must deal with multiple uncertainties — charging demand volatility, in-
herent intermittency of renewable energy generation, and wholesale electricity price
fluctuation. The motivation behind our work is to offer guidelines for charging ser-
vice providers to determine proper charging prices and manage electricity to balance
the competing objectives of improving profitability, enhancing customer satisfaction,
and reducing impact on power grid in spite of these uncertainties. We propose a
new metric to assess the impact on power grid without solving complete power flow
equations. To protect service providers from severe financial losses, a safeguard of
profit is incorporated in the model. Two algorithms — stochastic dynamic program-
ming (SDP) algorithm and greedy algorithm (benchmark algorithm) — are applied
to derive the pricing and electricity procurement policy. A Pareto front of the multi-
objective optimization is derived. Simulation results show that using SDP algorithm
can achieve up to 7% profit gain over using greedy algorithm. Additionally, we ob-
serve that the charging service provider is able to reshape spatial-temporal charging
demands to reduce the impact on power grid via pricing signals.
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4.2 Motivation and Related Work
Electric vehicles (EVs) exhibit many advantages over fossil fuel driven vehicles in
terms of operation and maintenance cost, energy efficiency, and gas emission [111–
113]. However, the fear of limited driving distance (range anxiety) is hanging over
EV drivers’ heads like the Sword of Damocles. To alleviate this range anxiety, the
capacity of on-board battery should be increased and more EV charging stations
should be deployed. Intensive research work has been carried out to study how to
strategically deploy charging stations [114–118]. Currently, EV charging service is
primarily provided for free as one of the employee benefits in some organizations
or as a perk to those owners of some specific EV models (e.g. Tesla). There is
a lack of viable and profitable pricing and energy management model for public
charging stations. Our goal is to offer guidelines for charging service providers to
make informed and insightful decisions on pricing and electricity procurement by
jointly optimizing multiple objectives under uncertainties.
There is a growing literature aimed at providing guidelines for economic opera-
tion of EV charging stations. In [119, 120], the authors studied a dynamic pricing
scheme to improve the revenue of an EV parking deck. However, their model did
not take into account customer satisfaction and the impact on power grid due to EV
charging. In [121–124], several algorithms have been proposed for a power aggrega-
tor to manage EV charging loads and submit bids to electricity market to provide
regulation service (RS). Game theory based approaches have been used to model the
interplay among multiple EVs or between EVs and power grid in [72, 125–127]. Yan
et al. presented a multi-tier real time pricing algorithm for EV charging stations to
encourage customers to shift their charging schedule from peak period to off-peak
period [128]. Nevertheless, they did not consider that some customers may strategi-
cally change their charging schedule in response to pricing signals. In [129], Ban et al.
employed multi queues to model the arrivals and departures of EVs among multiple
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charging stations. Pricing signals were used to guide EVs to different charging sta-
tions to satisfy the predefined quality of service (QoS); but the interactions between
EV charging and power grid was not analysed in their model. A distributed net-
work cooperative method was proposed to minimize the charging cost of EVs while
guaranteeing that the aggregated load satisfies safety limits [130]. Their model, how-
ever, did not incorporate renewable energy generation and consider charging demand
volatility.
In our model, we take a comprehensive view of these interweaving issues pertain-
ing to EV charging pricing and energy management. Specifically, we formulate our
problem to simultaneously optimize multiple objectives — improving the profit, en-
hancing the customer satisfaction, and reducing the impact on power grid in the light
of renewable energy generation and energy storage. Our model takes into account
multiple uncertainties including charging demand volatility, inherent intermittency
of renewable energy generation, and real time wholesale electricity price fluctuation.
For each type of uncertainty, an appropriate model is proposed and incorporated
in the overall optimization framework. Finally, a stochastic dynamic programming
(SDP) algorithm is employed to derive the charging prices and the electricity pro-
curement from the power grid for each planning horizon. Besides, SDP algorithm
has been used for water reservoir operation in [131, 132]. In terms of the electricity
retail market, a game theory based dynamic pricing scheme is studied in [133] which
also takes into account renewable integration and local storage.
The main contributions of our work are as follows:
• We proposed a multi-objective optimization framework to solve the problem,
and the solutions provide us insights into how to make a tradeoff among multiple
objectives of the profitability, the customer satisfaction, and impact on power
grid, and offer guidance to set charging prices to balance the charging demand
across the power system.
• We used Newton’s method to derive a fast-computing metric to assess the
impact of EV charging on power grid, which frees us from solving the complete
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nonlinear power flow equations. This metric also can be used to analyze other
electric load’s impact on power grid.
• We derived the active power and reactive power sensitivities for the load buses in
a power system which can serve as a guideline for EV charging station placement
to alleviate the charging stress on the power grid.
• In terms of market risk, we introduced a safeguard of profit for EV charging
service providers, which raises a warning when the profit is likely to reach a
dangerous threshold. This mechanism is beneficial for the charging service
provider to safely manage its capital and avoid severe financial losses.
4.3 Preliminary on Dynamic Programming
DP is an effective tool to solve complex optimization problems by partitioning it
into multiple simpler subproblems [134, 135]. DP is used to solve the problems that
have optimal substructures. Having formulated an optimization problem with a large
number of variables and constraints, we need to find an efficient approach to solve the
problem. DP takes a sequential or multistage decision process containing independent
variables and converts it into a series of simpler subproblems, each involving only a
few variables. After solving the subproblems, we can then obtain the solution to the
original problem by combining the results of the subproblems.
4.3.1 Basic Model
The basic model for DP has two assumptions: (1) an underlying discrete-time
dynamic system, and (2) a cost function that is additive over time. For a deterministic
system, the system dynamics, under the influence of decisions at the discrete instants
of time, is expressed as follows
xk+1 = fk(xk, uk), k = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1, (4.1)
where
• k: index of the discrete time instant,
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• xk: the state of the system at time k,
• uk: the decision variable at time k,
• N : the total number of horizons,
and fk is the system state evolution function.
The cost incurred at time k is denoted by gk(xk, uk), and the total cost is obtained
by summing the cost of all horizons
gN(xN) +
N−1∑
k=0
gk(xk, uk), (4.2)
where gN(xN) is a terminal cost incurred at the end of this process. The optimization
is taken over the control variables u0, u1, u2, · · · , uN−1.
J0(x0) = max
u0,u1,··· ,uN−1
[
gN(xN) +
N−1∑
k=0
gk(xk, uk)
]
. (4.3)
Apply the state evolution function xk+1 = fk(xk, uk), we can rewrite the optimization
problem as
J0(x0) = max
u0,u1,··· ,uN−1
[
gN(xN−1, uN−1) +
N−1∑
k=0
gk(x0, u0, u1, · · · , uk)
]
. (4.4)
Since horizon 0 does not depend on u1, · · · , uN−1, we can decompose the optimization
problem in the following way
J0(x0) = max
u0
[
g0(x0, u0) + max
u1,··· ,uN−1
(
N−1∑
k=1
gk(x1, u1, u2, · · · , uk) + gN(xN−1, uN−1)
)]
= max
u0
[g0(x0, u0) + J1(x1)]
= max
u0
[g0(x0, u0) + J1(f0(x0, u0))] .
(4.5)
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4.3.2 Principle of Optimality
Principle of Optimality: Let pi∗ = {u∗0, u∗1, · · · , u∗N−1} be an optimal policy for the
basic problem. Consider the subproblem where we are at xi at horizon i and wish to
minimize the “cost-to-go” from horizon i to horizon N − 1
gN(xN) +
N−1∑
k=i
gk(xk, uk). (4.6)
Then the truncated policy {u∗i , u∗i+1, · · · , u∗N−1} is optimal for the subproblem.
A proof of the principle of optimality (by contradiction) simply states that if the
remaining decisions were not optimal then the whole policy could not be optimal.
Specifically, if the truncated policy {u∗i , u∗i+1, · · · , u∗N−1} was not optimal as stated,
we would be able to further reduce the cost by switching to an optimal policy for the
subproblem once we reach xi.
The principle of optimality suggests that the optimal policy can be constructed in
a piecemeal manner. First, we construct an optimal policy for the “tail subproblem”
involving the last horizon, then we extend the optimal policy to the “tail subproblem”
involving the last two horizons, and continue in this manner until the optimal policy
for the entire problem is constructed.
4.4 Problem Formulation
In this study, we assume that an EV charging service provider operates a set of
charging stations within a large region. As a mediator between the wholesale market
and end customers (EVs), the charging service provider procures electricity from the
wholesale market and resells it to EVs. We also assume that the service provider
is able to harvest renewable energy (i.e. solar or wind power) and save it in an
energy storage system. An overview of the EV charging service provider’s model is
illustrated in Fig. 4.1.
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Figure 4.1. The EV Charging Market
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4.4.1 Profit of Charging Service Provider
In the United States, the Independent System Operator (ISO) or the Regional
Transmission Organization (RTO) collects supply offers from power plants and de-
mand bids from load serving entities (LSEs) or market participants, calculates the
day-ahead wholesale prices and real time spot prices, coordinates and monitors the
economic dispatch of electricity across a vast region [136–138]. We assume that the
charging service provider is an LSE, who purchases electricity from the wholesale
real time market and resells it to EVs. Let S = {s1, s2, · · · , sL} denote the charging
stations operated by the service provider. A day is divided into K planning hori-
zons. At the start of each horizon, the service provider will publish new charging
prices during this horizon. Price differentiation is allowed across charging stations.
Let P = {pk1, pk2, · · · , pkL}, k = 1, 2, · · · , K denote the charging prices in the k-th
horizon, and ok denote electricity procurement from the wholesale real time market.
We use wholesale real time electricity market prices in our theoretical analysis. Let
C = {c1, c2, · · · , cK} represent wholesale real time electricity prices. In addition, we
assume that the service provider has an energy storage system with capacity E MWh.
Let Ik denote the electricity in the storage at the beginning of the k-th horizon, and
uk be the renewable energy generation during the k-th horizon. The profit made in
the k-th horizon is given by
Wk =
L∑
j=1
pkjdkj − ckok−
ηs(Ik + ηcuk + ηcok − 1
ηd
L∑
j=1
dkj + wk),
(4.7)
where dkj corresponds to the charging demand (electricity consumption) at the j-
th station in the k-th horizon,
∑L
j=1 pkjdkj is the total revenue, ckok is the cost
of electricity procurement, and ηs($/MWh) is the unit storage cost, which includes
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capital cost and maintenance cost. Besides, ηc (0 < ηc < 1) and ηd (0 < ηd < 1)
are charging efficiency and discharging efficiency, respectively. And wk is the process
noise of the energy storage system, which has a Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and variance σ2w.
4.4.2 Customer Satisfaction
Customer satisfaction helps to build up customer loyalty, which can reduce the
efforts to allocate market budgets to acquire new customers. Poor customer satis-
faction will discourage people to purchase EVs, affecting the development of entire
EV industry. Customer satisfaction is one of the objectives in our multi-objective
optimization framework. Several customer satisfaction evaluation methods have been
investigated in [139–141]. In this paper, we consider the market-level customer sat-
isfaction instead of the individual-level satisfaction. We use a quadratic function to
formulate the overall customer satisfaction of all EVs in a horizon, namely,
Gk = −α
2
φ2k + ωφk, 0 ≤ φk ≤ E (4.8)
where E is the electricity storage capacity, ω and α are shape parameters, φk is the
aggregated charging demand (electricity consumption) of all EVs in the k-th horizon
which is defined as,
φk =
L∑
j=1
dkj. (4.9)
Eq. (4.8) with different shape parameters is plotted in Fig. 4.2. In plotting Fig.
4.2, we choose the shape parameters α and ω such that the concave function Gk has
a minimum of 0, which indicates that EV drivers have the least satisfaction, and a
maximum of 1, which indicates that they have the most satisfaction. Note that Eq.
(4.8) is a non-decreasing function with a non-increasing first order derivative. This
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implies that customer satisfaction will always grow as the total charging demand φk
increases, but the growth rate will decrease and customer satisfaction tends to get
saturated as the total charging demand approaches the storage capacity E. This is
a standard assumption following the law of diminishing marginal utility (Gossen’s
First Law) in economics [142].
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Figure 4.2. Sample Customer Satisfaction Functions (E = 200)
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4.4.3 Impact on Power Grid
Large-scale EV charging presents a substantial load to power networks [143, 144].
Many studies have shown that uncoordinated EV charging can affect the normal
operation of power grid in terms of severe power loss, voltage variation, frequency
deviation, and harmonics problems [50, 145–148]. Usually, grid frequency can be well
maintained either by the power generator side using automatic gain control (AGC)
[148] or by the load side using certain demand response techniques [149, 150]. In our
study here, we only consider the impact of voltage variation (magnitude and phase).
In addition, we assume that a higher-level entity like an aggregator or ISO/RTO can
take care of network transmission constraint issues within the power system under
its supervision, so the EV charging service provider does not need to worry about
transmission constraint problem. Let Fk denote the impact of EV charging on power
grid at the k-th horizon.
Fk = f(dk1, dk2, · · · , dkL), (4.10)
where dkj is the charging demand at the j-th charging station in the k-th horizon,
and f(.) is a function to be discussed in Section slowromancapiv@. Function f(.)
should reflect the basic assumption that the impact on power grid increases when the
charging demands increase.
4.4.4 Multi-Objective Optimization Framework
A multi-objective optimization problem arises naturally from the fact that the
charging service provider needs to balance multiple competing objectives — maxi-
mizing profit, maximizing customer satisfaction, and minimizing the impact on power
grid. For the k-th horizon, we formulate the multi-objective optimization as follows,
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max
Xk
{E(Wk),E(Gk),E(−Fk)}
s.t. Xk ∈ U(Xk),
(4.11)
where Xk = [pk1, pk2, · · · , pkL, ok]T is the vector of decision variables, and E(.) repre-
sents the expectation operation.
Clearly, there are several approaches to solve multi-objective optimization prob-
lems: weighted sum approach, adaptive weighted sum approach, -constraint ap-
proach, a priori approach and a posteriori approach [151–153], among others. The
weighted sum approach is not suitable for obtaining the whole Pareto front if the main
objective function is not convex. In this paper, we use an adaptive weighted sum
approach discussed in [153] to derive the Pareto front of Eq. (4.11). The main idea of
the adaptive weighted sum approach is that firstly we use the ordinary weighted sum
to obtain the basic shape of Pareto front, and then refine it by recursively reducing
mesh size within the Pareto front. First, we rewrite the problem as follows,
max
Xk
E(Πk) = E
{
λ1
Wk
Wmaxk
+ λ2
Gk
Gmaxk
− λ3 Fk
Fmaxk
}
s.t. Xk ∈ U(Xk),
(4.12)
where λ1, λ2, and λ3 are nonnegative coefficients, satisfying the constraint of λ1 +
λ2 + λ3 = 1. Different weight vectors (λ1, λ2, λ3) generates different convex Pareto
optima. The non-convex part of this Pareto front can be found in the refinement
phase. Additionally, Wmaxk , G
max
k , and F
max
k are the maximum values of each objective
function in the k-th horizon.
Our ultimate goal is to maximize the aggregated utility across multiple horizons.
(X∗1, · · · ,X∗K) = argmax
X1,··· ,XK
{
K∑
k=1
E(Πk)
}
,
s.t. Xk ∈ U(Xk), k = 1, 2, · · · , K.
(4.13)
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To solve this multi-horizon and multi-objective optimization problem, we face
several challenges: (1) How do we accurately estimate the charging demand dkj at
each charging station? (2) How do we develop an appropriate metric to assess the
impact on power grid defined in Eq. (4.10)? (3) How should we incorporate a
safeguard of profit to prevent severe financial losses? (4) How can we solve this
complex optimization problem in an efficient manner? In the following sections, we
will address these challenges in details.
4.5 Charging Demand Estimation
In practice, EV drivers will adjust their charging demands and charging sched-
ules in response to charging prices. The charging demand function dkj thus should
characterize customers’ response to price fluctuations. In our work, an online linear
regression model [154, 155] is employed to predict the charging demand dkj. For each
charging station, the predicted charging demand is defined as

dk1 = γ0,1 − γ1,1pk1 + γ2,1pk2 + · · ·+ γL,1pkL + k1,
dk2 = γ0,2 + γ1,2pk1 − γ2,2pk2 + · · ·+ γL,2pkL + k2,
...
dkL = γ0,L + γ1,Lpk1 + γ2,2pk2 + · · · − γL,LpkL + kL,
(4.14)
where γ0,j(j = 1, 2, · · · , L) is the intercept of the j-th linear regression equation,
γi,j = γj,i(i 6= j) are the cross-price elasticity coefficients, reflecting how the change
of the charging price at station j can influence the charging demand at station i, and
γi,i is the self-price elasticity coefficient, reflecting how the change of the charging
price of station i can influence its own charging demand. Finally kj(j = 1, 2, · · · , L)
is assumed to be an independent Gaussian random variable with mean 0 and variance
σ2kj. The variable kj captures the unknown random charging demand which cannot
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be characterized by the linear terms.
Recursive least square (RLS) algorithm is a common method applied to esti-
mate the coefficients in Eq. (4.14) using historical data [156, 157]. Let Yj =
[γ0,j, γ1,j, · · · , γL,j]T denote the vector of price elasticity coefficients related to the
j-th charging station. Applying RLS, we have the following update equations,

ekj = dkj −PTkYj,
gkj =
H(k−1)jPk
ν+PTkH(k−1)jPk
,
Hkj = ν
−1H(k−1)j − gkjPTk ν−1Pk,
Yj ← Yj + ekjgkj,
(4.15)
where ν is the forgetting factor. Besides, H0j is initialized to be an identity matrix
and P0 is initialized to be an all-zero vector. In addition, the estimate for variance
σ2kj is given by 
mkj = νm(k−1)j + kj,
nkj = νn(k−1)j + 1,
¯kj = mkj/nkj,
ukj = (
mkj−1
mkj
)2 + ( 1
mkj
)2,
vkj = mkj(1− ukj),
σ2j ← 1vkj [(νvkj)σ2j +
mkj−1
mkj
(¯kj − kj)2],
(4.16)
where mkj and nkj are initialized to be 0.
Eq. (4.14) can characterize the spatial-temporal variation of charging demand.
Different locations may have different charging demands. Thus, we use different lin-
ear regression equations to model these geographically separated charging stations.
Furthermore, the price elasticity coefficients are updated continually using RLS al-
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gorithm defined in Eq. (4.15) and Eq. (4.16). The forgetting factor ν enables us
to capture the most recent trend in charging demand and forget the outdated in-
formation. Thus, the RLS updating mechanism is able to track charging demand
fluctuation over time.
4.6 Impact on Power Grid from EV Charging
For power flow analysis, we assume that an N -bus power network has 1 slack bus,
M load buses (PQ buses), and N −M − 1 voltage-controlled buses (PV buses) [158].
Three phase balance operation and per-unit (p.u.) system are basic assumptions
here. Charging stations are deployed across different PQ buses. Solving the power
flow requires determining N − 1 voltage phases (corresponding to PQ buses and PV
buses) and M voltage magnitude (corresponding to PQ buses). This is done by
solving N +M −1 nonlinear power flow equations (N −1 active power equations and
M reactive power equations). The active and reactive power flow equations for each
bus are given as follows,
Pi = vi
N∑
k=1
vk(Gik cos(δi − δk) +Bik sin(δi − δk)), (4.17)
Qi = vi
N∑
k=1
vk(Gik sin(δi − δk)−Bik cos(δi − δk)), (4.18)
where vi and δi are, respectively, voltage magnitude and phase at the i-th bus; Pi
and Qi are real power and reactive power injections at the i-th bus; Gik and Bik are,
respectively, conductance and susceptance of the ik-th element of the bus admittance
matrix.
An increasing EV charging demand at PQ buses will lead to network-wide voltage
variation (magnitude and phase) if the network does not provide sufficient active
power and reactive power. We will use voltage variation as a metric to assess the
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impact of EV charging on power grid. Applying Newton’s method, we can calculate
the linear approximation of voltage variation in the following way,

∆V
∆Φ
 =

∂P
∂V
∂P
∂Φ
∂Q
∂V
∂Q
∂Φ

−1 
∆P
∆Q

= J−1

∆P
∆Q
 ,
(4.19)
where ∆V and ∆Φ are, respectively, vectors of magnitude variation and phase vari-
ation; ∆P and ∆Q are, respectively, vectors of increased active power and reactive
power due to EV charging. In addition, ∂P
∂V
and ∂P
∂Φ
are partial derivatives of active
power with respect to voltage magnitudes and phases, and ∂Q
∂V
, ∂Q
∂Φ
are partial deriva-
tives of reactive power with respect to voltage magnitudes and phases. In addition,
J−1 is the inverse of Jacobian matrix from power flow equations, which is given by
J−1 =

b1,1 b1,2 · · · b1,N+M−1
b2,1 b2,2 · · · b2,N+M−1
...
...
bN+M−1,1 bN+M−1,2 · · · bN+M−1,N+M−1

, (4.20)
Let the sequence [a1, a2, · · · , aL] denote the bus indexes of all charging stations
in the power network. For instance, ai(i = 1, 2 · · · , L) means that the i-th charging
station is fed by the ai-th bus in the power network.
Finally, we use the 2-norm voltage variation (magnitude and phase) to assess the
impact of EV charging on power grid,
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Fk =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
J−1

∆P
∆Q

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (4.21)
Moreover, we denote SAci and S
Re
i as the active power sensitivity and reactive
power sensitivity of the i-th PQ bus. And SAci is defined as follows,
SAci =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
J−1

0
...
0
1
0
...
0

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
, (4.22)
where SAci is the 2-norm voltage variation when the active power injection of the i-th
PQ bus is increased by 1 W. Thus, 1 W is the i-th entry in the column vector in Eq.
(4.22). Similarly, SRei is defined as the 2-norm voltage variation when the reactive
power injection of the i-th PQ bus is increased by 1 var. A larger value of SAci or S
Re
i
indicates that the PQ bus has a lower tolerance to load variation and more likely to
disturb the whole network.
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4.7 Stochastic Dynamic Programming for Pricing and Electricity Procurement
At first, this section introduces a safeguard of profit — a minimum profit warning
mechanism. In addition, major modules in SDP like renewable energy, real time
wholesale electricity price, and system dynamics are discussed. Finally, we introduce
the procedure to use SDP to derive pricing and electricity procurement policy.
4.7.1 A Safeguard of Profit
In practice, service providers make decisions on pricing and electricity procure-
ment based on the estimated charging demands. Although Eq. (4.14) provides a
viable way to estimate the charging demand, uncertainties still exist in actual charg-
ing demands. This subsection aims to develop a safeguard of profit to remind that
the charging service provider should make a certain amount of profit under severe
circumstance of uncertainties. We incorporate the safeguard as a constraint in the
optimization framework. Wherever the optimal solution touches this constraint (i.e.
this constraint becomes active), a warning will be raised for the service provider. The
constraint is given as follows,
Prob (Wk < Wmin) < ζ, (4.23)
where Wk is the profit made in the k-th horizon, Wmin is a profit threshold, and ζ is a
small positive number in the range of (0, 1). Eq. (4.23) specifies that the probability
that the actual profit is less than the profit threshold should be less than ζ.
Expanding Wk and rearranging terms in Eq. (4.23) yields the following,
Prob
(
XTkAXk + B
TXk + E
T
kZk + tk < Wmin
)
< ζ, (4.24)
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where Xk = [pk1, pk1, · · · , pkL, ok]T. Matrix A is given by
A =

−γ1,1 γ1,2 · · · γ1,L 0
γ2,1 −γ2,2 · · · γ2,L 0
...
...
...
...
γL,1 γL,2 · · · −γL,L 0
0 0 · · · 0 0

, (4.25)
and vector B is
B =
[
γ0,1 +
ηs
ηd
Γ1, · · · , γ0,L + ηs
ηd
ΓL,−ck − ηsηc
]T
, (4.26)
where Γj is
Γj = −γj,j +
L∑
i=1,i 6=j
γj,i, (4.27)
and vector E is
Ek =
[
pk1 +
ηs
ηd
, · · · , pkL + ηs
ηd
,−ηs
]T
, (4.28)
and Zk = [k1, k2, · · · , kL, wk]T, and tk = ηs(Γ0/ηd − Ik − ηcuk), where Γ0 is
Γ0 =
L∑
i=1
γ0,i. (4.29)
Besides, we assume that [k1, k2, · · · , kL, wk]T are independent Gaussian random
variables. Thus, ETkZk is also a Gaussian random variable with mean 0 and variance∑L
j=1(pkj + ηs/ηd)
2σ2kj + η
2
sσ
2
w.
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Finally, Eq. (4.23) can be rewritten as follows,
Prob
(
ETkZk < Wmin −XTkAXk −BTXk − tk
)
= Φ
 Wmin −XTkAXk −BTXk − tk√∑L
j=1(pkj + ηs/ηd)
2σ2kj + η
2
sσ
2
w
 < ζ, (4.30)
where Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a standard Gaussian
random variable.
4.7.2 Renewable Energy and Real Time Wholesale Price
Literature abounds on various approaches to forecasting renewable energy, e.g.,
physical approach [159, 160], statistical approach [161, 162], and hybrid approach
[163]. In this paper, we use a Markov chain model [164]-[165] which is a statistical
approach, to demonstrate how renewable energy prediction is incorporated into our
optimization model. In fact, other forecasting approaches can also be used in our
model.
Markov chain characterizes the transition from the current renewable energy uk
to the next uk+1. We discretize renewable energy into D levels, and the transition
matrix at the k-th horizon is given by,
Tk =

tk,1,1 tk,1,2 · · · tk,1,D
tk,2,1 tk,2,2 · · · tk,2,D
...
...
tk,D,1 tk,D,2 · · · tk,D,D

, (4.31)
where tk,i,j is the transition probability of renewable energy from level i to level j in
the k-th horizon, and
∑D
j=1 tk,i,j = 1. All transition probabilities can be estimated
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from historical data.
Similar to renewable energy, real time wholesale price forecasting has also been ex-
tensively studied through time series analysis, machine learning, big data, or hybrid
approach in [166, 167]. Real time price forecasting is a topic beyond the techni-
cal scope of our paper. Thus, we do not study specific real time price forecasting
approaches in this paper.
4.7.3 Stochastic Dynamic Programming
Eq. (4.13) is a complex multi-variable optimization problem involving K(L + 1)
variables. It may be mathematically cumbersome and difficult to solve in a brute-force
manner. We observe that the original problem exhibits the properties of overlapping
subproblems and optimal substructure, which can be solved efficiently using SDP.
SDP solves a large-scale complex problem by partitioning it into a set of smaller and
simpler subproblems [168, 169]. The solution to the original problem is constructed
by solving and combining the solutions of subproblems in a forward or backward
manner. In contrast to a brute-force algorithm, SDP can greatly reduce computation
and save storage.
In a wholesale real time electricity market, electricity is sold on an hourly basis. So
our problem should have a finite number of planning horizons with K = 24. System
dynamics are governed by the evolution of system states, under the influence of
decision variables and random variables. In our case, system dynamics are expressed
by the following equations
Ik+1 = Ik + ηcuk + ηcok − 1
ηd
φk + wk,
uk+1 = h(uk, υk),
(4.32)
where Ik represents electricity storage at the beginning of the k-th horizon, uk is
renewable energy, ok is the electricity procurement, ηc is the charging efficiency, ηd
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is the discharging efficiency, and φk is the total charging demand. Besides, wk and
υk are independent process noises for the energy storage system and the renewable
energy generation.
The aggregated expected utility from the first horizon to the K-th horizon is given
by
E
{
ΠK+1(IK+1, uK+1) +
K∑
k=1
Πk(Ik, uk)
}
, (4.33)
where ΠK+1(IK+1, uK+1) is a terminal utility occurred at the end of this process, and
the expectation is taken over kj(j = 1, · · · , L) defined in Eq. (4.14), wk, and υk.
Therefore, the maximum aggregated expected utility J(I1, u1) is given by
J1(I1, u1) = max
X1,··· ,XK
E
{
ΠK+1 +
K∑
k=1
Πk
}
,
s.t.
Prob(Wk < Wmin) < ζ
0 ≤ ok ≤ omax; k = 1, 2, · · · , N
pkj ≥ 0; j = 1, 2, · · · , L
Ik + uk + ok −
∑L
j=1 dkj ≥ 0
Ik + uk + ok −
∑L
j=1 dkj ≤ E
dkj ≥ 0; j = 1, 2, · · · , L.
(4.34)
Applying SDP we can partition the problem into multiple small subproblems, which
can be calculated recursively as follows,
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Jk(Ik, uk) = max
Xk∈Uk(Xk)
E {Πk + Jk+1(Ik+1, uk+1)}
= max
Xk∈Uk(Xk)
{E{Πk(Ik, uk)}+
E{Jk+1(Ik+1, uk+1)}} .
(4.35)
Furthermore, we can rewrite each subproblem into a nice quadratic form by com-
bining like terms as follows,
Jk(Ik, uk) = max
Xk∈Uk(Xk)
{
E{1
2
XTkQXk
+ BTkXk}+ E{rk}
}
,
(4.36)
where Q, Bk, and rk are given by
Q =

−2γ1,1λ1 − αλ2Γ21 − 2λ3
∑N+M−1
j=1 Θ
2
1,j · · · 2γ1,Lλ1 − αλ2Γ1ΓL − 2λ3
∑N+M−1
j=1 Θ1,jΘL,j 0
2γ2,1λ1 − αλ2Γ2Γ1 − 2λ3
∑N+M−1
j=1 Θ2,jΘ1,j · · · 2γ2,Lλ1 − αλ2Γ2ΓL − 2λ3
∑N+M−1
j=1 Θ2,jΘL,j 0
...
...
2γL,1λ1 − αλ2ΓLΓ1 − 2λ3
∑N+M−1
j=1 ΘL,jΘ1,j · · · −2γL,Lλ1 − αλ2Γ2L − 2λ3
∑N+M−1
j=1 Θ
2
L,j 0
0 · · · 0 0

,
(4.37)
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Bk =

λ1(γ0,1 +
ηs
ηd
Γ1) + λ2
(
ω
∑L
j=1 γ1,j − αΓ0Γ1
)
− 2λ3
∑N+M−1
j=1 Θ0,jΘ1,j
...
λ1(γ0,L +
ηs
ηd
ΓL) + λ2
(
ω
∑L
j=1 γL,j − αΓ0ΓL
)
− 2λ3
∑N+M−1
j=1 Θ0,jΘL,j
−(ck + ηsηc)λ1

,
(4.38)
rk =λ1ηs(Γ0/ηd − Ik − ηcuk) + λ2
(
ωΓ0 − α
2
(
Γ20 +
L∑
j=1
σ2k,j
))
−
λ3
(
N+M−1∑
j=1
Θ20,j + λ3
N+M−1∑
j=1
L∑
i=1
b2j,aiσ
2
k,j
)
+ Euk+1{Jk+1(Ik+1, uk+1)},
(4.39)
where Θn,j is
Θn,j = −bj,anγn,n +
L∑
i=1,i 6=n
bj,aiγi,n, (4.40)
and an is the bus index of the power network for the n-th charging station, and
Θ0,j =
L∑
i=1
bj,aiγ0,i. (4.41)
Finally, Jk+1(Ik+1, uk+1) is the total aggregated utility starting from the (k + 1)-
th horizon to the K-th horizon. Fig. 4.3 illustrates the schematic of the entire
optimization framework. The charging service provider should run the SDP engine
at the beginning of every planning horizon.
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Figure 4.3. Dynamic Pricing and Energy Management Algorithm
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4.8 Simulations and Discussions
The simulation coefficients are given in Table 4.8. Tesla’s home rechargeable
Lithium-ion battery system — Powerwall has a 92.5% round-trip DC efficiency with
100% depth of discharge [170]. Eos Energy Storage has a battery-based energy storage
with a round-trip efficiency of 75% and a 100% depth of discharge [171]. In our
simulation, we assume the charging efficiency ηc and discharging efficiency ηd are both
0.9. For simplicity, we use the day-ahead wholesale electricity price data from PJM
[172] to represent the real time wholesale price forecasting in the simulations, but
other forecasting approaches can be used. In addition, we assume that the charging
service provider procures electricity at a single locational marginal price (LMP). We
use solar power to represent the renewable energy source. The solar radiation data
is from National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) [173], and the typical daily
solar radiation is depicted in Fig. 4.4. Note that solar radiation begins at 6:00 am
and ends at 8:00 pm. Additionally, we assume that solar cell efficiency is 20%. We
use IEEE 57 Bus Test case for the power network in our simulations [174].
4.8.1 SDP Algorithm versus Greedy Algorithm
The greedy algorithm aims to optimize the current planning horizon without
considering the future. We use the greedy algorithm as a benchmark, to which we
compare the SDP algorithm in terms of profitability. The profit percentage gain of
SDP algorithm compared to greedy algorithm is shown in Fig. 4.5. The simulation
reveals that the SDP algorithm can achieve up to 7% profit gain compared to the
greedy algorithm. The reason why SDP is able to obtain a higher profit is that it fully
exploits the information of day-ahead wholesale electricity prices and renewable en-
ergy prediction, and makes decisions to optimize the aggregated utility over multiple
horizons. However, the greedy algorithm lacks a forward-looking vision, which solely
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TABLE 4.1
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Coefficient Description Unit Value
N Horizon number - 24
E Energy storage capacity MWh 200
λ1 Profit weight - 0 to 1
λ2 Customer weight - 0 to 1
λ3 Impact weight - 0 to 1
ζ Revenue safeguard prob. - 0.2
α Shape parameter - 5e-5
ω Shape parameter - 0.01
ηs Unit storage cost $/MWh 0 to 4
ηc Charging efficiency - 0.9
ηd Discharging efficiency - 0.9
ρ0 Knee point threshold - 1
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maximizes the utility of the current horizon. As far as the computational complexity
is concerned, greedy algorithm has a linear time complexity with O(K), and SDP
has a quadratic time complexity with O(K2), where K is the number of planning
horizons. This is because the greedy algorithm only involves one loop from horizon
0 to horizon 23. However, the SDP algorithm has two loops with the outer loop
starting from horizon 0 to horizon 23 and the inner loop for backward recursive SDP
calculation. In essence, the SDP algorithm trades complexity for a higher profit.
4.8.2 Aggressive or Conservative Electricity Procurement Strategy
An electricity storage enables the charging service provider to store the intermit-
tent renewable energy or excessive electricity when the wholesale price is low, and
sell it to EVs when the wholesale price is high. In this subsection, we analyse how
this “buy low and sell high” strategy will change when the unit storage cost (ηs = 0
to 4) changes. In Fig. 4.6, electricity procurement strategies with different unit stor-
age costs are depicted in the first four subplots, and the last subplot shows the real
time wholesale electricity prices. We can make three observations: (1) From 8:00 to
16:00, the service provider tends to procure less electricity from the wholesale market
because of renewable energy generation at this period of time, and (2) The service
provider tends to procure more electricity during the low wholesale price period (from
3:00 to 6:00) and procure less electricity during the high wholesale price period (from
11:00 to 17:00), and (3) When ηs is small, the service provider becomes aggressive
in electricity procurement during low price period, and when ηs is large, it becomes
more conservative.
4.8.3 Charging Price with Safeguard of Profit
In the simulation, we investigate the interplay between charging prices and the
safeguard of profit. From Fig. 4.7, we note that the charging prices increase as the
95
profit threshold Wmin increases. According to Eq. (4.30), we must ensure the proba-
bility ζ does not change even if Wmin increases. In other words, (Wmin −XTkAXk −
BTXk − tk)/(
√∑L
j=1(pkj + ηs/ηd)
2σ2kj + η
2
sσ
2
w) should not change as Wmin increases.
The simulation results show that the charging service provider ends up raising charg-
ing prices to ensure the probability ζ.
4.8.4 Pareto Optima and Knee Points
We need to simultaneously maximize multiple objectives — profit, customer sat-
isfaction, and the negative of impact on power grid. Each point in Fig. 4.8 is a Pareto
optimum in which it is impossible to increase any one individual objective without
decreasing at least one of the other objectives [151]. The Pareto front is obtained by
using the linear interpolation fitting method [175].
Knee points in the Pareto front provide the best tradeoff among multiple objec-
tives, which yield largest improvement per unit degradation. Following the metric
discussed in [176, 177], we define ρ(Yi, S) to represent the least improvement per
unit degradation by replacing any other Pareto optima in S with Yi. The entries in
Yi = [y1i, y2i, y3i]
T represent the profit, the customer satisfaction, and the impact on
power grid, respectively.
ρ(Yi, S) = min
Yj∈S,j 6=i
∑3
k=1 max(0, yki − ykj)∑3
k=1 max(0, ykj − yki)
. (4.42)
Then we set a threshold ρ0 to select the knee points as follows,
Sρ0knee = {Yi|ρ(Yi, S) > ρ0;Yi ∈ S}. (4.43)
We use ρ = 1 in the simulations. The knee points are marked in red in Fig. 4.9.
We notice that there are several knee regions among the Pareto optima, which reflect
different preference over the three objectives — profit, customer satisfaction, and the
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impact on power grid.
4.8.5 Interplays between Profit, Customer Satisfaction, and Impact on Power Grid
The projection of Pareto optima on the Profit-Customer plane is plotted in Fig.
4.10. We observe that customer satisfaction decreases when profit increases. This
is because the charging service provider raises charging prices to decrease the to-
tal charging demand. The decreased total charging demand leads to a decreased
customer satisfaction. However, the net effect of raising charging prices is that the
service provider achieves a higher profit. Therefore, the service provider should strike
a balance between the two competing objectives of profit and customer satisfaction.
The projection of Pareto optima on the Profit-Impact plane is plotted in Fig.
4.11. It turns out that the impact and the profit are not competing objectives since
the impact on power grid decreases when profit increases. The increased charging
prices cause a decrease in total charging demand, relieving the stress on power grid.
However, the profit is improved even though the total charging demand decreases.
Fig. 4.12 shows the projection of Pareto optima on the Customer-Impact plane.
Note that customer satisfaction and the impact are competing objectives since the
impact on power grid increases as customer satisfaction increases. It is obvious that
customer satisfaction and impact on power grid are both related to the total charging
demand. According to Eq. (4.8), customer satisfaction increases when the total
charging demand increases. However, the increased charging demand will inevitably
pose a heavier stress on the power grid.
4.8.6 Spatial Charging Demand versus Impact on Power Grid
The relationship between spatial charging demand and impact on power grid is
shown in Fig. 4.13. Due to limited space, we only plotted the charging stations
with even indices. We observe that as the impact on power grid (Qk) decreases,
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the charging demands of Charging Station #2 (CS#2) and Charging Station #20
(CS#20) decrease while the charging demands of other charging stations increase.
This is because the PQ buses feeding CS#2 and CS#20 have larger active power sen-
sitivity metric SAci than the others. The active power sensitivity for charging stations
with even indices are [0.80, 0.61, 0.33, 0.17, 0.31, 0.29, 0.22, 0.60, 0.29, 1.33]. Note that
CS#8 has the smallest active power sensitivity 0.17, its charging demand increases
very fast as the impact decreases. While CS#20 has the largest active power sen-
sitivity 1.33, its charging demand decreases fast. Thus, the service provider has to
shift the charging demands from the PQ buses with large SAci to those with small
SAci to reduce the impact on power grid.
4.9 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a multi-objective optimization framework for EV charging
service provider to determine retail charging prices and appropriate amount of elec-
tricity to purchase from the real time wholesale market. A linear regression model
is employed to estimate EV charging demands. To cope with multiple uncertain-
ties, SDP algorithm is applied to simplify the optimization problem. Compared to
greedy algorithm (benchmark), SDP algorithm can make a higher profit at the cost
of increased algorithm complexity. A lost-cost electricity storage is beneficial for the
service provider to harvest the intermittent renewable energy and exert the “buy low
and sell high” strategy to improve profits. In addition, the service provider can shift
charging demands from high-sensitive buses to low-sensitive buses to alleviate the
impact on power grid by changing charging prices.
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CHAPTER 5
THE DESIGN OF A LIBERAL ELECTRICITY TRADING MARKET AND
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK — A SHARING ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE
5.1 Overview
In this chapter, we explore ways to apply the prevalent sharing economy model
to the electricity market to stimulate different entities to exchange and monetize
their underutilized electricity. The design of a liberal electricity trading market and
distribution network is presented, which enhances liberal electricity trading, fosters
renewable energy generation, facilitates distributed storage and integration of electric
vehicles (EVs), and manages network congestion. In our study we treat electricity as
a heterogenous commodity which has multiple characteristics such as active power,
reactive power, power factor, power quality (voltage, frequency), energy sources (i.e.
coal, wind, solar), delivery rate, delivery time, etc. An online advertisement-based
peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity trading mechanism is proposed for producers and con-
sumers to publish their supply offers and demand bids with different requirements
and preferences. Accordingly, a fitness-score (FS) based matching algorithm is de-
veloped to select the best supply-demand pairs by taking into account consumer
surplus, network congestion, and economic power dispatch. We compare the FS
matching algorithm with a first-come-first-serve (FCFS) based matching algorithm
(the benchmark algorithm). The simulation reveals that the FS matching algorithm
outperforms the FCFS algorithm in terms of network congestion management, elec-
tricity delivery delay probability, energy efficiency, and consumer surplus.
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5.2 Motivation and Related Work
The process of electricity market deregulation has provided a fair and competitive
wholesale market for giant power plants and load serving entities (LSEs), which fa-
cilitates free electricity trading, enhances power grid stability, and ensures economic
power dispatch [178–181]. Although a deregulated electricity market exhibits some
advantages over a regulated market, it still has inherent disadvantages arising from
the inner market and infrastructure. First, it remains a challenge for the existing
electricity delivery infrastructure to naturally integrate volatile and intermittent re-
newable energy sources (RESs). Second, the nature of bulk electricity transactions in
a wholesale market impedes small/micro power producers to participate in the mar-
ket. Third, the strict membership requirements of a wholesale market participant
excludes end customers and small business from directly accessing the market, who
can actually play a significant role in an electricity network like a microgrid.
5.2.1 Related Work
There is increasing research aimed at addressing the problem of electricity trad-
ing in the context of a smart grid. In [182], a stock exchange based local electricity
market was proposed, where electricity is traded during fixed trading intervals and de-
livered after a predefined time interval like in a stock exchange market. In [183, 184],
agent-based market designs were studied and a double auction model was employed
to determine the clearing price. In [185], the authors proposed a local P2P electricity
trading of plug-in electric vehicles (PHEV) based on a consortium blockchain model.
They also used a double auction to derive optimal electricity price. A game theory
based approach was applied to analyze the interplay between electricity producers
and consumers in [186, 187]. In [186], the authors applied a coalitional game to model
the direct electricity trading between small-scale electricity suppliers and end users,
where the Shapley value was used to derive the price in the market. In [187], a model
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of stochastic programming and game theory was studied to generate optimal bidding
strategy for wind and conventional power producers. In [188], the author first dis-
cussed the possibility of applying a sharing economy model to the smart grid, which
sets up a P2P platform for producers and consumers to trade their underutilized elec-
tricity. Furthermore, [189] explored the applicability of sharing economy for a smart
grid and formulated the investment decisions as a non-convex non-cooperative game.
In addition, a security analysis of a local electricity trading market was conducted in
[190].
Note that the existing literature mostly focused on electricity market design in
terms of market operation, economics analysis, and security issues. Other important
factors such as network congestion forecast and avoidance, delivery cost and distri-
bution strategy have been mostly neglected. Besides, electricity is usually treated as
a homogeneous commodity, but it can actually have different characteristics in terms
of active power, reactive power, power factor, energy sources (i.e. wind, solar, coal,
etc.), power quality (voltage, frequency), delivery starting/ending time, and delivery
rate, etc. In this chapter we will propose an online advertisement based electric-
ity market design which takes into account network congestion, delivery cost, and
consumer surplus. In addition, we will present a new electricity distribution strategy
which can naturally support variable electricity delivery and discontinuous renewable
energy integration.
5.2.2 Main Contributions
The motivation of our work is to design a liberal electricity trading market and
distribution network which provides a flexible, reliable and economical platform to
support seamless RES integration, grid to vehicle (G2V), vehicle to grid (V2G),
vehicle to vehicle (V2V), and distributed generation (DG) and storage. Recently, a
sharing economy model is prevailing in a few industries which have fundamentally
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changed our life, e.g. Uber/Lyft in the transportation industry [191, 192], Airbnb in
the accommodation industry [193], and LendingClub in the online loan and lending
industry [194]. Basically, a sharing economy model is a P2P platform for individuals
to trade and monetize their underutilized services or resources [195, 196]. Similarly, in
this study we apply a sharing economy model in designing electricity and distribution
network, where electricity is regarded as a type of commodity and everyone can
sell excessive electricity via this platform. In contrast to the traditional electricity
network, there is not a clear delimitation between the roles of a consumer and a
producer in our design. Instead, every individual can switch from a consumer to a
producer, or vise versa freely in the network. For instance, an EV is a consumer when
it is being charged, whereas it becomes a producer when it discharges. A household
with a solar panel and a local energy storage installed can be a producer during sunny
days and a consumer during rainy days. To build up this electricity market network,
we need to develop new algorithms and mechanisms for both market operation and
electricity delivery.
The main contributions of our work are summarized as follows,
• Propose an online advertisement-based mechanism for producers and consumers
to submit their electricity supply offers and demand bids, which treats electric-
ity as a heterogeneous commodity with multiple characteristics.
• Develop a fitness score-based supply and demand matching algorithm by consid-
ering consumer surplus, network congestion, and renewable energy integration.
• Design a novel electricity distribution policy which naturally supports intermit-
tent renewable energy generation and variable electricity delivery rate.
• Propose a demand and surge pricing prediction algorithm to alleviate network
congestion.
5.3 Problem Formulation
The proposed electricity trading market and distribution network consists of four
modules: (1) demand and surge price prediction module, (2) supply and demand
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matching module, (3) electricity flow optimization module, and (4) electricity network
scheduling module. Fig. 5.1 shows the modules of the entire system.
5.3.1 Supply and Demand Matcher
Inspired by the ClassAd and Matchmaking mechanism from HTCondor in the
distributed computing community [197], we will use a similar mechanism to match
the demands and supplies in the electricity trading market. In HTCondor, ClassAd
offers a flexible representation of characteristics and constraints of both computa-
tion jobs and host machines. Jobs can specify their requirements (i.e. CPU, GPU,
memory, I/O, etc.) and job preferences. Likewise, host machines can state the re-
quirements and preferences they would like to admit to run. Basically, the ClassAd
and Matchmaking mechanism behaves like an e-commerce where buyers and sellers
post their advertisements and search for potential peers. The supply and demand
matcher (SDM) module in our design collects the electricity demand advertisement —
DemandAd from consumers, and supply advertisement — SupplyAd from producers,
and employs a ranking algorithm to identify the best pairs. Examples of DemandAd
and SupplyAd are shown in table 5.1 and table 5.2, respectively.
The DemandAd consists of 9 elements:
• Demand ID (DID) — The unique ID assigned for every demand advertisement
which is submitted to the SDM.
• Bus ID (BID) — The Bus ID from which the demand advertisement is submit-
ted.
• Zone ID (ZID) — The zone ID where the bus belongs to.
• Quantity (Q) — The required electricity.
• Power factor (θ) — The power factor of this electricity delivery task which is
the ratio of active power to apparent power.
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TABLE 5.1
DEMANDAD EXAMPLE
DemandAd
Entry Unit Value
DID - 123
BID - 10
ZID - 1
Q MWh 15
θ - 0.7
Tmin YYYY-MM-DD
HH:MI:Sec
2017-6-11
17:00:00
Tmax YYYY-MM-DD
HH:MI:Sec
2017-6-11
18:00:00
pbid $/MWh 10
R MW 2
DM Boolean False
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TABLE 5.2
SUPPLYAD EXAMPLE
SupplyAd
Entry Unit Value
SID - 100
BID - 9
ZID - 2
Q MWh 100
θmin - 0.4
θmax - 0.9
Tmin YYYY-MM-DD
HH:MI:Sec
2017-6-12
17:00:00
Tmax YYYY-MM-DD
HH:MI:Sec
2017-6-12
18:00:00
poffer $/MWh 8
Rmin MW 1
Rmax MW 5
DM Boolean False
ET Boolean False
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• Minimum start time (Tmin) — The earliest time when the bus expects to receive
electricity.
• Maximum start time (Tmax) — The latest time when the bus expects to receive
electricity.
• Bid price (pbid) — The highest price the bus is willing to pay for a supplier.
• Delivery rate (R) — The delivery rate at which the bus expects to receive
electricity from a supplier.
• Delivery method (DM) — This element specifies that if the bus can accept
discontinuous electricity delivery. If DM = True, the bus can accept discon-
tinuous electricity delivery, which DM = False indicates that it cannot accept
discontinuous electricity delivery.
The SupplyAd consists of 10 elements:
• Supply ID (SID) — The unique ID for every supply advertisement which is
submitted to SDM.
• Bus ID (BID) — The Bus ID from which the supply advertisement is submitted.
• Zone ID (ZID) — The zone ID where the bus belongs to.
• Quantity (Q) — The maximum electricity that the bus can supply.
• Minimum power factor (θmin) — The minimum power factor.
• Maximum power factor (θmax) — The maximum power factor.
• Minimum start time (Tmin) — The earliest time when the bus expects to supply
electricity.
• Maximum start time (Tmax) — The latest time when the bus expects to supply
electricity.
• Offer price (poffer) — The lowest price at which the bus is willing to supply
electricity.
• Minimum delivery rate (Rmin) — The minimum delivery rate at which the bus
expects to supply electricity.
• Maximum delivery rate (Rmax) — The maximum delivery rate at which the bus
expects to supply electricity.
• Delivery method (DM) — This element specifies that if the bus will supply dis-
continuous electricity. If DM = True, the bus supplies discontinuous electricity,
which DM = False indicates that it supplies continuous electricity.
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• Energy type (ET) — This element specifies that if the electricity is generated
from renewable sources (i.e. solar, wind). ET = True indicates it is renewable
energy, which ET = False indicates it is not renewable energy.
For every DemandAd, SDM generates a set of SupplyAds which satisfy the re-
quirement specified by this DemandAd. Then, SDM applies a matching algorithm
to those SupplyAds to find the optimal one for this DemandAd. If such a SupplyAd
exists, SDM claims to have a supply-demand pair. Basically, the matching algo-
rithm uses a formula to calculate a fitness score for every SupplyAd and ranks those
SupplyAds by scores. The formula is given as follows,
S(i, j) = α1
pbidi − pofferj
pbidmax − poffermin
− α2 Di,j
Dmax
+ α3Z(i, j) + α4E(j), (5.1)
where pbidi and p
offer
j are the bid electricity price of the i-th DemandAd and the
offer electricity price of the j-th SupplyAd, respectively. And pbidmax and p
offer
min are the
maximum bid price among all DemandAds and the minimum offer price among all
SupplyAds, respectively. Hence (pbidi − pofferj ) represents the cost saving that the i-th
DemandAd can obtain from the j-th SupplyAd, which is normalized by (pbidmax−poffermin ),
while α1 is the corresponding weight parameter. In addition, Di,j is the predicted
electricity delivery price from the j-th SupplyAd to the i-th DemandAd, which will
be paid to the electricity network operator, and Dmax is the maximum electricity
delivery price with α2 being the corresponding weight parameter. In the following
subsection, we will discuss in more details on how to predict electricity delivery
price. Furthermore, Z(i, j) is an indicator function, which is equal to 1 if buses of the
DemandAd and SupplyAd belong to the same zone in the electricity network. The
idea here is that SDM prefers to match supply-demand pairs that are geographically
close to each other so that delivery cost can be reduced and electricity distribution
lines can be wisely utilized. And α3 is the weight parameter for Z(i, j). Besides,
E(j) is an indicator function, which is equal to 1 if the j-th SupplyAd bus supplies
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renewable energy. And α4 is the weight parameter for E(j). After normalization, the
four terms all have the range from 0 to 1, and the corresponding weight parameters
are non-negative and have the constraint of α1 + α2 + α3 + α4 = 1.
Once the demand-supply pairs are matched, SDM generates a predefined number
of routes for each demand-supply pair. SDM employs the breath-first-search (BFS)
[198] algorithm to find the routes from a SupplyAd bus to a DemandAd bus in
the electricity network. SDM sends the route information to the next module —
electricity flow optimizer.
5.3.2 Electricity Flow Optimizer
The objective of the electricity flow optimizer (EFO) is to minimize power loss
in the electricity network by choosing the optimal routes and determine the optimal
electricity flow along the distribution lines. First, we assume that electricity delivery
is scheduled at an interval of T int. We use Kh to represent the set of active supply-
demand pairs during the h-th interval. We denote Lh as the number of distribution
lines (branches) to be used in the h-th interval. Note that the branch indices used in
the following analysis may not necessarily be the same as the indices in the electricity
network for simulations. For the electricity network, it has internal branch indices,
so we need to convert the branch indices in theoretical analysis to internal branch
indices in simulations. We use J hk to represent the set of routes for the k-th demand-
supply pairs during the h-th interval. We denote βhk,j,l as the power flow (in MW) of
the l-th branch of the j-th route of the k-th demand-supply pair. Let Qhk represent
the scheduled power delivery (in MW) of the k-th supply-demand pair. Let rl denote
the resistance (in Ω) of the l-th branch. To minimize energy loss, EFO seeks the
most economic way to deliver electricity over the network. For ease of notation, we
drop the interval superscript in the following analysis. Mathematically, EFO aims to
solve an optimization problem formulated as follows,
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argmin
βk,j,l
L∑
l=1
rl

∑
k∈Kl
∑
j∈Jk,l
βk,j,l
Ul

2 , (5.2a)
s.t.
∑
k∈Kl
∑
j∈Jk,l
βk,j,l ≤ Cl; l = 1, 2, · · · , L, (5.2b)
βk,j,l1 = βk,j,l2 = βk,j,l3 = · · · = βk,j,lk,j ; for any k ∈ K, j ∈ Jk, (5.2c)∑
j∈Jk
βk,j,l1 = Qk; for any k ∈ K, (5.2d)
where Kl is the set of supply-demand pairs whose routes contain the l-th branch, Jk,l
is a set of routes of the k-th demand-supply pair in Kl whose route path contains the
l-th branch, and Ul is the voltage of the l-th branch. Hence, the objective function
defined by Eq. (5.2a) is the sum of power loss of all involved branches.
Additionally, Eq. (5.2b) assures that the power flow along each branch does not
exceed its capacity. In Eq. (5.2c), a sequence of branches (l1, l2, l3, · · · , lk,j) form the
the j-th route of the k-th demand-supply pair. Obviously, Eq. (5.2c) requires that
the power flow of branches of the same route should be the same. Besides, Eq. (5.2d)
stipulates that the sum of all routes’ power flow be equal to the scheduled power
delivery for every demand-supply pair.
Note that the objective function in Eq. (5.2a) only depends on the quadratic
terms of the variables, so we can formulate it as a quadratic programming problem
by arranging and grouping like terms.
argmin
X
1
2
XTPX, (5.3a)
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s.t.
AX = b, (5.3b)
GX ≤ h, (5.3c)
where X = [XT1 , X
T
2 , · · · , XTL ]T is the variable vector, and Xl(l = 1, 2, · · · , L) is a sub-
vector consisting of power flows βk,j,l on the l-th branch of different supply-demand
pairs. Specifically,
Xl =

β1,l
β2,l
...
βnl,l

, (5.4)
where βn,j denotes the n-th power flow on the l-th branch.
Matrix P has the following form,
P =

P1
P2 0
. . .
0 PL−1
PL

(5.5)
where the submatrix Pl is given by
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Pl =
rl
U2l
Jnl , (5.6)
and Jnl is an nl × nl all-one square matrix, whose entries are all 1’s.
We notice that P is a symmetric block diagonal matrix. All diagonal submatrices
are all-one square matrices multiplied by a scalar, which are positive semidefinite. So
matrix P is also positive semidefinite [199]. Therefore, the quadratic programming
problem defined in Eq. (5.3) is convex and we can obtain a global optimum using
common optimization packages in Matlab, Cplex, and Joptimizer.
5.3.3 Demand and Surge Price Prediction Module
In this study, the payment of a DemandAd consists of two components — electric-
ity procurement cost and electricity delivery cost. The electricity procurement cost
is the money that a DemandAd pays to the SupplyAd for electricity procurement.
The electricity delivery cost is the money that a DemandAd pays to the electricity
network operator for electricity delivery. However, a surge price multiplier may be
added to the electricity delivery cost if the supply-demand pair uses certain con-
gested branches in the delivery of electricity. The surge price mechanism has been
used in a few ride-hailing companies like Uber (i.e. Surge Price) or Lyft (i.e. Prime
Time) [200, 201]. For Uber Surge Price or Lyft Prime Time, a customer in a high
demand region is likely to be charged at a higher price (surge price). Likewise, if
a supply-demand pairs uses some congested branches, the DemandAd must pay a
higher electricity delivery price to the network operator.
The surge price mechanism follows the basic supply and demand principles. For
instance, we consider a potential supple-demand pairs (i, j) — the i-th DemandAd
and the j-th SupplyAd, whose delivery starting time is ti,j and scheduled electricity
delivery is Qi,j. First SDM uses the BFS algorithm to compute the routes Ji,j for
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this pair. To predict the delivery cost, we first find the set of supply-demand pairs
Si,j which will be active during the ti,j-th interval. All supply-demand pairs in Si,j
are from previous matched pairs which have an earlier delivery starting time than
ti,j. Then SDM sends the information of Si,j to EFO. EFO uses Si,j to compute
the power flow F basel on each branch. For each branch l in Ji,j, we add Qi,j to the
corresponding branch flow F basel .
F nowl = Qi,j + F
base
l . (5.7)
We define threshold brackets for the aggregated branch flow. If the aggregated
branch flow F nowl falls into a certain threshold bracket, a surge price multiplier will be
applied accordingly. Furthermore, if the aggregated branch flow exceeds the largest
threshold, this supply-demand pair will be rejected by SDM. If the supply-demand
pair is not rejected, the delivery price can be calculated using the following formula,
D(i, j) = γi,jvRi,jT
int, (5.8)
where Ri,j is the delivery rate (in MW) of this supply-demand pair, T
int (in hour) is
the interval duration, and v is the flat delivery price (in $/MWh). Additionally, γi,j
is the surge price multiplier which is defined as follows,
γi,j =

γ1 Fl < 0.5Cl
γ2 0.5Cl ≤ Fl < 0.75Cl
γ3 0.75 ≤ Fl < 0.9Cl
rejected Fl ≥ 0.9Cl
(5.9)
Note that the aggregated branch flow is computed and compared to its corre-
sponding branch capacity for each branch in Ji,j, where we use the largest γi,j value
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of all used branches in Eq. (5.8). Besides, the predicted delivery cost may not be
exactly equal to the real delivery cost used in the payment settlement module. This
is because new supply-demand pairs can be added to the network after the delivery
cost is predicted. The new pairs may eventually increase the aggregated branch flows
in real electricity scheduling, which makes previous predictions inaccurate. Although
there may exist prediction error in delivery cost, it can still reflect the electricity flow
congestion in the network at a particular time. Hence the delivery cost prediction is
used as a factor in the ranking algorithm defined in Eq. (5.1).
5.3.4 Payment Settlement Module
Electricity delivery is financially settled at every time interval. The final payment
can be calculated using the following formula,
M(i, j) = pofferj Ri,jT
int + γi,jvRi,jT
int, (5.10)
where Ri,j is the delivery rate (in MW) of the j-th SupplyAd and the i-th DemandAd,
T int (in hour) is the interval duration, and pofferj is the electricity procurement price (in
$/MWh). So the first term represents the electricity procurement cost. The second
term is the electricity delivery cost. The payment settlement module will determine
the final γ based on true power flow from the electricity network scheduler.
5.4 Simulations and Discussions
We compare the proposed FS matching algorithm defined by Eq. (5.1) with a
FCFS matching algorithm, which we take as a benchmark algorithm in the simu-
lations. For the benchmark matching algorithm, we first sort the DemandAds and
SupplyAds by their submission time in ascending order. The benchmark matching
algorithm involves two loops. In the outer loop, it iterates every DemandAd over the
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DemandAd list. In the inner loop, for each DemandAd, it iterates over the SupplyAd
list until we find a match for this DemandAd or we reach the end of the SupplyAd
list. We use IEEE 118 Bus Test Case as a proxy for the electricity network in simu-
lations [202]. The simulation parameters are given in Table 5.4. Specifically, pactive is
an important parameter to simulate network traffic. In the simulations, each idle bus
has a probability of pactive/2 to submit a DemandAd, and a probability of pactive/2
to submit a SupplyAd, and a probability of 1 − pactive to remain idle. Besides, the
electricity quantity for either DemandAd or SupplyAd is in the range of [20, 45] MWh
and the bid or offer price is in the range of [5, 10] $/MWh. The comparison is done
based on the following metrics: network congestion probability, electricity delivery
delay probability, network throughput, power loss, and consumer surplus.
5.4.1 Network Congestion Probability
In this simulation, we compare the FS matching algorithm and the FCFS match-
ing algorithm in terms of the network congestion performance under different network
traffic scenarios. A network congestion occurs when the EFO module cannot find a
feasible power flow schedule plan for a given set of supply-demand pairs, which means
one or more branch flow must violate branch capacities. The simulation reveals that
as the electricity network traffic changes from idle to busy (pactive increases from
0.1 to 1.0), the network congestion probability increases for both the FS and the
FCFS matching algorithms. However, the FS matching algorithm can always achieve
6% to 12% lower congestion probability than the FCFS algorithm for the same net-
work traffic, see Fig. 5.2. This is because the FS matching algorithm leverages the
information from demand and surge price prediction module to select the appropri-
ate supply-demand pairs. These supply-demand pairs avoid using the congestion
branches, therefore it is less likely to cause network congestions.
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TABLE 5.3
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Coefficient Description Unit Value
pactive Bus active probability - 0.1 to 1.0
T int Interval duration minutes 15
γ1 Surge price multiplier - 1.0
γ2 Surge price multiplier - 2.0
γ3 Surge price multiplier - 4.0
γ4 Surge price multiplier - 8.0
α1 Para. for price gap - 0.2
α2 Para. for delivery cost - 0.4
α3 Para. for bus zone - 0.2
α4 Para. for renewable - 0.2
Qmax Max supply/demand MWh 45
Qmin Min supply/demand MWh 20
Nr Route number - 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
pbidmax Max bid price $/MWh 100
pbidmin Min bid price $/MWh 50
pbidmax Max offer price $/MWh 100
poffermin Min offer price $/MWh 50
Nsim Simulation interval number - 100000
Cl Branch capacity MW 200, 500
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5.4.2 Electricity Delivery Delay Probability
Once the SDM matches a SupplyAd with a DemandAd, the delivery starting time
and ending time are also determined. However, sometimes a few supply-demand pairs
may not complete the electricity delivery as scheduled due to network congestion or
network traffic control, so their original delivery plans have to be delayed. Obviously,
customer satisfaction decreases if the electricity market accepts the supply-demand
pairs but fails to schedule and finish electricity delivery on time. Here, we want
to compare the FS matching algorithm and the FCFS algorithm in their electricity
delivery delay performance. From Fig. 5.3, we note that the electricity delivery
delay performance has a similar trend to the network congestion performance. As
the electricity network traffic load increases (pactive increases from 0.1 to 1.0), the
delay probability of the FCFS algorithm increases from 2.0% to 23.9%, while the
delay probability of the FS algorithm increases from 0.9% to 12.6%. It is clear that
the FS matching algorithm outperforms the FCFS algorithm for all network traffic
scenarios. In particular, the FS matching algorithm performs very well under the low
traffic network scenarios (pactive from 0.1 to 0.4), since the delay probability almost
does not change.
5.4.3 Network Throughput
Another metric for network performance analysis is network throughput. We
define the electricity network throughput as the average power (in MW) the network
can successfully deliver. The simulation results show that both algorithms have
an increase in network throughput as pactive increases from 0.1 to 1.0. The FCFS
algorithm achieves a larger network throughput than the FS algorithm. This is
because the FCFS algorithm does not use any traffic control mechanism. Instead, it
will accept any supply-demand pair as long as a SupplyAd matches the requirements
of a DemandAd. However, the FS algorithm compares the aggregated branch flow
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and rejects some supply-demand pairs if their delivery rates are very likely to overload
the branches. Thus, the FS algorithm may accept fewer supply-demand pairs than
the FCFS algorithm. So the FS algorithm has a smaller throughput than the FCFS
algorithm. This is a tradeoff between throughput and network congestion. While the
FCFS algorithm has a larger throughput, it suffers severe electricity delivery delay
and network congestion.
5.4.4 Power Loss
Thermal power loss occurs if electricity is transferred over a resistive distribution
line. In this simulation, the power loss of the electricity network with FS and FCFS
algorithms are compared. We define the power loss as the ratio of the thermal power
loss to the network throughput,
PL =
Ploss
Π
, (5.11)
where Ploss is the thermal power loss (in MW) and Π is the network throughput (in
MW).
Fig. 5.5 shows that the FS matching algorithm have 0.5% to 2% lower power loss
ratio than the FCFS matching algorithm. This is because the FS matching algorithm
matches a SupplyAd for a DemandAd by looking at the electricity procurement cost,
the electricity delivery cost, the relative geographical locations and the electricity
generation method of this SupplyAd. The supply-demand pair within the same zone
and lower delivery cost is favored by the FS algorithm. If a supply-demand pair
belongs to the same zone, it does not use inter-zone distribution lines, which can
reduce power loss due to long-distance transmission. On the other hand, the surge
price multiplier defined in Eq. (5.9) imposes a heavy penalty to those supply-demand
pairs using congestion branches, which can reduce the branch currents, thereby re-
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ducing the overall power loss because the power loss is directly proportional to the
square of current.
5.4.5 Consumer Surplus
Consumer surplus is defined as the difference between the total amount that
consumers are willing to pay for a product or service and the total amount that they
actually pay [203]. In our study, the bid price in a DemandAd is the highest price
the consumer is willing to pay for electricity, and the offer price in a SupplyAd is
the lowest price the consumer actually needs to pay. In this simulation, we use the
average consumer surplus to compare the two algorithms, which is defined as follows,
CS = Π ∗ (pbidavg − pofferavg ), (5.12)
where Π in MW is the network throughput, pbidavg and p
offer
avg are the average bid price and
average offer price, respectively. Thus, the average consumer surplus CS has a unit
of $/hour. Fig. 5.6 shows that the FS matching algorithm achieves a larger consumer
surplus than the FCFS algorithm. The FS algorithm has a lower network throughput
than the FCFS algorithm, but it has a much larger price saving (pbidavg − pofferavg ). Thus
it turns out that the FS algorithm still outperforms the FCFS algorithm in consumer
surplus.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter studies a novel electricity trading market and distribution network
for electricity producers and consumers to exchange their underutilized electricity
in a flexible, efficient, and economic manner. In particular, we treat electricity as
a heterogenous commodity which has different characteristics such as active power,
reactive power, power factor, power quality, delivery rate, etc. We propose an online
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advertisement mechanism for producers and consumers to publicize their demand
bids and supply offers, with which they can specify their delivery requirements and
constraints. A demand and surge price prediction algorithm is developed to allevi-
ate network congestion. In addition, we propose a FS matching algorithm to match
supply-demand pairs. Compared to the FCFS matching algorithm (the benchmark
algorithm), the FS matching algorithm achieves better performance in terms of net-
work congestion management, electricity delivery delay probability, energy efficiency,
and consumer surplus.
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Figure 5.2. Electricity Network Congestion Comparison
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Figure 5.3. Electricity Delivery Delay Comparison
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Figure 5.4. Electricity Network Throughput Comparison
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CHAPTER 6
MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Main Contributions
This dissertation aims to solve three critical issues arising from the EV prolifera-
tion: (1) optimal EV charging station placement, (2) dynamic pricing and electricity
management policy of EV charging station, and (3) an electricity trading market and
distribution network redesign for large-scale EV and renewable energy integration.
Our main contributions are summarized in the following subsections.
6.1.1 Optimal EV Charging Station Placement
To solve the problem of EV charging station placement, we developed a multi-
stage placement strategy considering incremental EV market penetration rates and
the 3-way interactions among EVs, the traffic network, and the electricity network. A
nested logit model was first employed to characterize the EV driver’s satisfaction and
charging preference, which was used to predict overall charging demand. An oligopoly
market form was then applied to model the EV charging market. We analyzed how
the EV charging service providers will interact with each other. In addition, we
developed a simulation toolkit called “The EV Virtual City” based on Repast to
simulate the real-time EV traffic and how EVs would interact with the changing
surroundings. Finally, we developed an Android application called “Charging Butler”
which serves as an assistant for EV drivers to search for the optimal charging station
and provides turn-by-turn navigation.
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6.1.2 Dynamic Pricing and Electricity Management Policy of EV Charging Station
In Chapter 4, we proposed a multi-objective optimization framework to jointly op-
timize multiple objectives of improving profitability, enhancing customer satisfaction,
and reducing the charging impact on the power system. In addition, we developed
a new metric to evaluate how EV charging will impact the power system, which
is fast-computing and frees us from solving nonlinear power flow equations. Addi-
tionally, we derived the active power and reactive power sensitivity formula for the
load buses in a power system which can serve as a guideline for EV charging station
placement to alleviate the charging stress on the power grid. In terms of market risk,
we introduced a safeguard of profit for EV charging service providers, which raises
a warning when the profit is likely to reach a dangerous threshold. This mechanism
is beneficial for the charging service provider to manage its capital and avoid severe
financial losses.
6.1.3 Electricity Trading Market and Distribution Network Redesign
To foster large-scale EV integration and renewable energy generation, we pro-
pose to design a liberal electricity trading market model and a distribution network
from a perspective of sharing economy. We designed a peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity
trading market based on an online advertisement mechanism. Accordingly, a fitness
score (FS)-based matching algorithm was studied to pair up the best supply ads and
demand ads by considering electricity network congestion control, renewable energy
integration, and consumer surplus. A new electricity distribution mechanism was
also investigated to naturally support multi-rate electricity delivery and discontinu-
ous renewable energy generation.
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6.2 Future Work
There are many other interesting problems on EV charging and integration which
are worth studying in the future. Some future research topics include: (1) apply
machine learning and data mining to help EVs choose optimal EV charging stations
and charging scheduling, (2) energy aware routing for EVs, and (3) decentralized
P2P electricity trading market and distribution network design.
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APPENDIX A
DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL FORMULA
A.1 Derivation of Eq. (3.10)
We assume the unobservable utility δ has extreme value distribution with a prob-
ability density function given by
f(δ) = e−δe−e
−δ
(A.1)
and the cumulative distribution function is
F (δ) = e−e
−δ
(A.2)
The probability that a consumer chooses alternative k is given by
Pk = Prob(Mk + δk > M l + δl, ∀l 6= k)
= Prob(δl < δk +Mk −M l, ∀l 6= k)
(A.3)
If δk is assumed to be known, the expression above is the cumulative distribution
function for each δl evaluated at δk + Mk − M l. According to Eq. (A.2), this is
equal to exp(− exp(−(δk + Mk −M l))). Since the unobservable utility is i.i.d., the
probability for all l 6= k is the product of each cumulative distribution
Pk|δk =
∏
l 6=k
e−e
−(δk+Mk−Ml) (A.4)
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Then, the choice probability is the integral of Pk|δk over the distribution of δk
Pk =
∫ ∞
−∞
(∏
l 6=k
e−e
−(δk+Mk−Ml)
)
e−δke−e
−δnk dδk (A.5)
Define u = δk, and we shall have
Pk =
∫ ∞
−∞
(∏
l 6=k
e−e
−(u+Mk−Ml)
)
e−ue−e
−u
du (A.6)
Note that Mk −Mk = 0 and we can collect terms in the following way
Pk =
∫ ∞
−∞
(∏
l
e−e
−(u+Mk−Ml)
)
e−udu
=
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
−
∑
l
e−(u+Mk−M l)
)
e−udu
=
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
−e−u
∑
l
e−(Mk−M l)
)
e−udu
(A.7)
Then we define s = e−u, so ds = −e−udu
Pk =
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−s
∑
l
e−(Mk−M l)
)
ds
=
e−s(Mk−M l)
−∑l e−(Mk−M l)
∣∣∣∣∣
∞
0
=
1∑
l e
−(Mk−M l)
=
eMk∑
l e
M l
(A.8)
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where the second last equality holds because Int = log
(∑L
l=1 e
V
n
l,t/σk
)
.
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APPENDIX B
MOBILE APPLICATION DEVELOPMENT — EV CHARGING BUTLER
We develop a location-aware EV charging station recommender android appli-
cation. The main functionality of this application is to assist EV driver search for
optimal EV charging station and provide turn-by-turn navigation to get there.
First, an EV driver needs to log into the application using his/her Facebook
account, see Fig. B.1. Then, the user sees the main activity, where a Google Map
is displayed. The user can choose map types (i.e. normal, satellite, hybrid, and
terrain), see Fig. B.2. In addition, an EV charging station map is integrated into
the application. We use the application programming interfaces (APIs) to query
and fetch the charging station information from the charging station map which is
provided by the Open Charge Map Organization. The red markers in Fig. B.2
represent the nearby EV charging stations.
After selecting a charging station, the Google Maps will provide turn-by-turn
navigation to the user, see Fig. ??. The application has a main menu, where the
user can see his/her profile (i.e. picture, name, email) and edit the preference and
settings, and perform logout action, see Fig. ??.
I implemented the profile setting activity and charging preference activity, see
Fig. B.3 and Fig. B.4. In profile setting activity, the user can choose the vehicle
type. In the charging preference activity, the user can edit his/her preferences about
distance, cafe, cinema, supermarket, etc. I also implemented the recommendation
engine algorithm and the recommendation list panel. See Fig. B.5 and Fig. B.6. Fig.
B.5 displays the list of recommended charging stations which are ordered according
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the scores from recommendation engine. Fig. B.6 displays the detailed information
of a charging station if the user clicks one from the recommendation list.
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Figure B.1. Facebook Login Activity
139
Figure B.2. Main Activity
140
Figure B.3. Profile Settings
141
Figure B.4. Charging Preference Settings
142
Figure B.5. Recommendation List
143
Figure B.6. Charging Station Information
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